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Abstract   Philosophy has long become a key term in the study of Buddhism, defining the moral 
and rational essence of the Buddha’s teaching, emblematic of its Indian origins. In this essay, I 
suggest that the relation of Buddhism and philosophy, which prior to the mid-nineteenth century 
was framed as the relation of the Religion of Fo to the cult of voidness, was reformulated in the 
self-styled language of science in the wake of the study of Buddhism from Sanskrit sources. 
Specifically, I suggest that the philosophical dimension of Eugène Burnouf’s reading of the 
Divyāvadāna and his idea of “simple sūtra” played a crucial role in defining Buddhism as a 
philosophy for the late nineteenth and into the twentieth century. The idea of a “simple moral 
philosophy” emerged in Burnouf’s particular reading of the story of the Buddha’s last days in the 
Divyāvadāna and the Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta, as the play of magic and death unfolds in the 
theme of the master’s denial of the will to live. Burnouf’s philosophical reading rests on the 
purification, in the theme of the Buddha’s parinirvāṇa, of the foundations of magical power 
(catvāra ṛddhipāda) that articulate knowledge of this world and beyond in the Buddha’s 
discourses. In the conclusion, I reformulate Burnouf’s question about the Buddha’s moral 
philosophy in his study of the simple sūtras vis-à-vis the historically self-conscious question 
about the Buddha’s ability to defer death by magic that traces back to the early debate of 
Buddhist exegetical traditions. 
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Buddhism, Philosophy, History. On Eugène Burnouf’s Simple Sūtras. 
 
Martino Dibeltulo Concu 
 
The Indian mind was wanting in that simplicity, which can believe without knowing, as well as in 
that bold clearness, which seeks to know without believing, and therefore the Indian had to frame 
a doctrine, a religion and a philosophy combined, and therefore, perhaps, if it must be said, neither 
the one nor the other; Buddhism. 
 
— Hermann Oldenberg, Buddha: His Life, His Doctrine, His Order (1881).1 
 
When we think of Buddhism it is natural to think of philosophy. For the scholar of Asia and for 
the student of religion, philosophy has long become a key term in the study of Buddhism, 
defining the moral and rational essence of the Buddha’s teaching, emblematic of its Indian 
origins. Yet, prior to the mid-nineteenth century, in a long history of writing about Asia, the 
question of whether Buddhism is a philosophy, a religion, both, or neither, was not an important 
question. Questions on the nature of Buddhist doctrine began to emerge in Europe during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the accounts of the religions of Asia by Christian 
missionaries, merchants, and voyagers. By the early nineteenth century, such questions, raised 
from the perspective of Christian theology, were thus familiar to European scholars at the 
institutional site of the production of knowledge about Asia—Oriental philology. Still, questions 
about Buddhist doctrine raised at this institutional site were often reformulations of earlier, 
theological concerns, in the name of a new, self-styled language of science. To understand 
Buddhism as a philosophy, we must understand how the attitude of Oriental philology changed 
toward the Buddha—his life and his doctrine—in writing the history of Buddhism in India. To 
do so, we must understand how the Buddha’s doctrine came to be related with particular notions 
of history in the wake of the study of Buddhism from Sanskrit sources.2 
                                                            
1  Oldenberg (1882, p. 6). 
2 For a historical approach to Buddhism and philosophy, see the two volumes by App (2010), (2012); for 
the discourse of Buddhism and Science and the European encounter with the Buddha across the premodern and the 
modern age, see Lopez (2008), (2012), (2013), and (2016); see also Sharf (2015), who focuses in particular on the 
relation of Buddhism to Western phenomenology. For examples of contemporary trends in the study of Buddhism 
and philosophy, see the studies by Arnold (2005), Coseru (2012), Garfield (2015), Garfield et al. (2009), and 
Siderits et al. (2010). In taking a genealogical perspective, the present article does not engage directly a comparative 
approach. By revisiting the foundational texts and figures that contributed to shaping the relation of Buddhism and 
philosophy, the aim of the present study is not to define the nature of such a relation, rather to suggest that the 
relation of Buddhism and philosophy has been empowered by what it excludes: the “foundations of magical power” 
(S. ṛddhipāda), namely the roots of “superknowledge” (S. abhijñā), the technology of truth upon which knowledge 
is constituted in Buddhist discourse. The relation of Buddhism and philosophy must implicate the question of the 
degree to which Buddhist forms of morality and rationality are separable from the doctrinal domains engendered by 
magical discourse as it unfolds in history. For an analysis of the idea that “Buddhism is a philosophy, not a religion,” 
see also Bernard Faure’s Unmasking Buddhism. Faure (2009, pp. 27-34) suggests that one solution to avoiding the 
problem of defining Buddhism as either a philosophy or a religion, the term “thought,” as in the phrase “Buddhist 
thought,” could be taken into consideration as an alternative. While the present study agrees with Faure (2009, p. 
33), in that “by failing to question the privilege granted to a certain type of Western rationalist discourse, we risk 
contributing to a new and more subtle form of exclusion, again shifting the question to the West,” it does not 
suggest, for lack of better terms, to substitute philosophy with other terms in relation to Buddhism. For, if alternative 
terms might provisionally seem more suitable to avoid the exclusion of magical discourse as the nonrational, for as 
long as the generative stages of the discourse of Buddhism and philosophy remain unknown, the risk of using 
alternative, seemingly neutral terms, might only result in further obscuring the history of the relation of Buddhism 
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Prior to Brian Houghton Hodgson’s (1800-1894) discovery of the Sanskrit Collection of 
Nepal during the 1820s,3 and the publication in 1844 of Eugène Burnouf’s (1801-1852) 
Introduction à l’histoire du Buddhisme indien,4 European theologians and philologists regarded 
Buddhism for the most part as a religion. The Buddha, portrayed as an idol, a false god whose 
origins were lost in the archive of the religious customs of India, had just recently become to 
Oriental philology the historical founder of a great Asian religion. In 1819, in a groundbreaking 
study entitled “Sur quelques épithètes descriptives de Bouddha, qui font voir que Bouddha 
n’appartenait pas a la race nègre” (“On Some Descriptive Epithets of Buddha, Showing that 
Buddha Did Not Belong to the Negro Race”), Jean-Pierre Abel-Rémusat (1788-1832) 
demonstrated beyond dispute that the Buddha was a historical human being. In refuting Sir 
William Jones’s (1746-1794) famous theory of the African Buddha, according to which the 
pagan gods of the ancient Mediterranean were nothing but the idols adored in modern Asia 
worshipped under different names, Abel-Rémusat asserted that, because of his Indian birth, the 
Buddha was a historical figure whose descent was that of the European race.5 
By the 1820s, the human life of the Buddha, together with his Āryan descent, was thus 
established as a historical fact. Still, before a clear distinction was made between the study of 
Buddhism from original sources in Sanskrit and Pāli and secondary sources in Chinese, Tibetan, 
and Mongolian, Oriental philology regarded Buddhism as the “Religion of Fo,” an archaic name 
of the religion taking the Chinese name of the Buddha. To European scholars, as for Christian 
theologians, the Religion of Fo was a false religion, if compared with the monotheistic religions. 
Before it consistently portrayed Buddhism as philosophy, Oriental philology thus regarded 
Buddhism as an Indian form of Idolatry (otherwise referred to as Paganism, Heathenism, or 
Polytheism) that had taken root throughout the countries of Asia. But what was to be made of 
this form of Idolatry in terms of its metaphysical and moral systems? By the 1780s, as Sir 
William Jones speculated on the African origins of the idol Fo, Orientalists had come to the 
conclusion that his religion was the combination of a twofold doctrine. The Religion of Fo was 
endowed with a double core: an outer form of polytheistic worship, based on the cult of idols, 
and an inner metaphysical doctrine, grounded in a simple morality and centered on the cult of 
voidness or nothingness. 
In an essay entitled “Recherches sur la religion de Fo, professée par le Bonzes Ho-chang 
de la Chine” (“Researches on the Religion of Fo, Professed by the Ho-shang Bonzes of China”), 
written in the 1780s but published only in 1825, the renowned Sinologist Michel-Ange-André 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and philosophy—which not always abides to the rules of the East/West or rational/nonrational divide—along with 
the ethical and epistemological implications that this history bears on the study of Buddhism. 
3 On Hodgson, see Lopez (1995), (2004). 
4 On Eugène Burnouf, see Lopez (1995), (2008), (2010), (2013), (2016). 
5 Prior to the publication of Abel-Rémusat’s study, other European writers had claimed that the Buddha 
was a human figure. Not only that, they also claimed that he was a philosopher. Still, the Buddha was a philosopher 
who taught a form of morality, and yet whose doctrine retained the errors of its origin in polytheism. See, for 
example, the 1817 brochure by the French scholar Michel-Jean-François Ozeray (1764-1859), entitled Recherches 
sur Buddou ou Bouddhou, where he writes: “Down from the altar where blindness and superstition had placed him, 
Buddhou is a dinstinguished philosopher, a sage born for the happiness of his kin and the good of humanity. A 
deified man, he is the foremost of the religious legislators of East Asia. His doctrine, despite the second level of 
error, while destroying coarse superstitions, still retains the vice of its origin: it is infected with polytheism. 
Concerning its morality, the author presents, but often exaggerates, to man his duties, seduced by the desire to make 
himself more appreciated.” (1817, p. 111, my translation). For Ozeray, see also Droit (2003, p. 40), and Faure (2009, 
p. 17). I would like to thank Hyoung Seok Ham for pointing to Ozeray as a representative of scholars who called the 
Buddha “a philosopher” prior to Burnouf (private communication, September 2016). 
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Leroux Deshauterayes (1724-1795) offered a summary of several centuries of European debates 
on Buddhist doctrine.6 “The Religion that we are about to describe,” he writes, “is original of the 
Indies; its author is Boudh or Bouda so well-known in China under the name Fo, and in Japan 
under that of Chaka.”7 In describing the double nature of the Religion of Fo, Deshauterayes 
writes: 
 
The missionaries say that this is a sect whose doctrine is twofold: the one, external, accepts the 
worship of idols, teaches the transmigration of souls, and prevents from eating that which has had 
life; the other, inner or secret, asserts nothing but voidness or nothingness, does not recognize 
penalties or rewards after death, meaning that nothing was ever real, asserts that everything is an 
illusion, and regards the transmigration of souls into the bodies of animals as a figurative passage 
of the soul into the brutal affections and inclinations of these very beasts; it is a doctrine that in 
this regard would be entirely moral, for its object is the victory of the soul over her dissolute 
affections, if only there could ever be a real morality where nothing exists that is real.8 
 
In this précis, Deshauterayes condenses many of the central themes that characterized the 
European encounter with the Buddha. These are themes that through the nineteenth century 
challenged professional Orientalists such as Abel-Rémusat and Burnouf, and whose implications 
troubled philosophers such as Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-
1900):9 the pagan cult of idols and the transmigration of souls, the nihilistic view of voidness or 
nothingness, and the nature and value of morality in a world without a creator God. If truth about 
these themes developed through centuries of European translation and interpretation of Buddhist 
doctrine, it is hardly an accident that by the early 1880s, when the celebrated Indologist Hermann 
Oldenberg (1854-1920) published his Buddha: His Life, His Doctrine, His Order, perhaps the 
most widely read book about Buddhism during the twentieth century, this truth resonated in his 
statement about the twofold nature of Buddhism as a “religion and a philosophy combined.” 
However, despite echoes of Deshauterayes’s seemingly archaic views in Oldenberg’s more 
familiar language, did the German Indologist portray an entirely different truth about Buddhist 
doctrine, or, for that matter, a merely altered version of the same truth, as the French 
Orientalist?10 
                                                            
6 See also App (2010b). The editorial project of publishing Deshauterayes’s manuscripts was undertaken 
by Abel-Rémusat in the decade that followed his appointment as the first chair of Chinese at the Collège de France 
in 1814. In a footnote to the essay on the Religion of Fo, Abel-Rémusat says that the majority of the works by 
Deshauterayes remained unpublished since the year of his death in 1795. Soon after Abel-Rémusat took his position, 
he found a large number of Deshauterayes’s manuscripts collected in the archives of the Bibliothèque du Roi (the 
present-day Bibliothèque Nationale) in Paris. Yet most of Deshauterayes’s essays were unfinished, or in a state that 
made it impossible to collect them for publication. See Deshauterayes (1825, p. 150n). 
7 See Deshauterayes (1825, pp. 150-1). My translation. On Deshauterayes, see App (2010), (2012). 
8 See Deshauterayes (1825, pp. 152-3). My translation. For a detailed analysis of this passage, see the study 
on Arthur Schopenhauer’s “love affair” with China in App (2010b, pp. 20-29). App has shown the importance of 
Deshauterayes’s essay on the Religion of Fo in regard to Schopenhauer’s understanding of the Buddha’s “inner 
doctrine,” an idea whose philosophical reformulation was incorporated by the German philosopher into the second 
edition of The World as Will and Representation. Moreover, App (2010b, p. 22) identified the work entitled Dazang 
yilan (“The Buddhist Canon at a Glance”), compiled in 1157 by the Song-dynasty scholar Chen Shi, as the Chinese 
source for Deshauterayes’s “inner doctrine.” 
9 For Schopenhauer’s understanding of Buddhism see App (2010b), (2011), and Droit (2003); for 
Nietzsche and Buddhism see, for example, Mistry (1981), Elman (1983) and Panaïoti (2013), and in particular Droit 
(2003). 
10 The present essay suggests that the separation of Buddhism into a philosophy and a religion is not a 
novelty that begins with the breakthrough of the self-styled scientific study of Buddhism that begins in the 1820s. 
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In his inquiry from Chinese sources, Deshauterayes engages the mode of the Christian 
theologian, subsuming Buddhist doctrine into an early modern program of truth by which early 
professional Orientalists sought to demonstrate the inferiority and worthlessness of its 
conceptions as a system of Paganism. In contrast, as a modern historian-philologist, Oldenberg’s 
questions arose in the frame of the much newer program in the tradition of Oriental philology 
that traces to the work of Burnouf, the founder of the field of studies that during the nineteenth 
century was referred to as the “Science of Buddhism.” By consulting sources in Sanskrit and in 
Pāli, the modern historian of Buddhism gained access, in his scientific imagination, to the reality 
of the setting of the Buddha’s teaching in ancient India. And, as this reality unfolded before his 
eyes, the Orientalist could know and describe historical facts about the Buddha and the true 
nature, together with the Indian essence, of his doctrine. In the mind of the modern historian and 
critic of Buddhism, the question on the nature of Buddhist doctrine, whether a philosophy or a 
religion, was thus a question of belief—in Oldenberg’s words, the faculty to “believe without 
knowing”—and its relation to knowledge—the faculty to “know without believing”—.  
Still, in saying that the “Indian mind” had to formulate Buddhist doctrine, a philosophy 
and a religion combined, Oldenberg also concedes that such a doctrine is, “therefore, perhaps, if 
it must be said, neither the one nor the other.” Indeed, in his play of negations, Oldenberg leaves 
something unsaid, as if a third term of comparison, one that is neither philosophy nor religion, 
prevents Buddhism from being defined as a philosophy, a religion, or both combined. To engage 
this question, we thus pause at the outset in a moment of self-reflection. By the very gesture 
through which he defines his object of study, the German scholar opens the meaning for this 
object as that which it both is and is not—philosophy and religion. This essay suggests that this 
third, unsaid and yet constitutive, term in the modern definition of Buddhism as philosophy is to 
be traced to the category of ṛddhipāda, that is, the magical foundation upon which knowledge of 
both this world and beyond is constituted in Buddhist discourse. To understand the relation of 
Buddhism to philosophy, we must then trace the relation of magic to history and legend in the 
work of the founder of the study of Buddhism, where this relation was formulated in the 
scientific language of Oriental philology as the removal of magic from the historical Buddha’s 
moral and rational teaching. To be sure, Burnouf’s scientific method rests on such a purification, 
in the theme of the Buddha’s parinirvāṇa, of the foundation of magical powers that articulates 
knowledge in the world of Buddhist scriptures.11 Indeed, the idea of a “simple moral philosophy” 
emerged in Burnouf’s particular reading of the story of the Buddha’s last days, as the play of 
magic and death unfolds in the master’s denial of the will to live. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Rather, as App has suggested (2010a, pp. 189-190), the innovations of professional Orientalism were marked by a 
transformation of the European knowledge about Buddhism that is far from being a clear-cut break from the 
“missionary” past. The idea of a distinction between an inner and an outer doctrine of the Buddha’s teaching was 
widely popular in Europe since the sixteenth century, when, as App notes, the Jesuits engaged in dialogue about 
Buddhist doctrine with Zen monks in Japan. For this dialogue, see App (2007). One implication is not only the 
problem of how the same division into inner and outer doctrine was reconfigured and re-contextualized in the new 
language of science, but also the ways in which the division of Buddhism as religion and philosophy owes part of its 
history to the Jesuits and their theological concerns, their Buddhist informants and their choices in relating Buddhist 
doctrine to the Jesuits, and the philologists who interpreted the encounter of the former two. The problem of the 
distinction of Buddhism into a philosophy and a religion must be traced within the global network of knowledge 
whose actors and their diverse motives travel in a world that in many ways transcends the monolithic West-East (or 
Europe-Orient) divide. For this line of reasoning, see Hallisey (1995, pp. 31-33). 
11 On the idea of Buddhism as a “purified religion,” see Lopez (2012, pp. 1-20). 
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I 
 
In 1824, as Abel-Rémusat prepared Deshauterayes’s essays on the Religion of Fo for 
publication in Paris, Brian Houghton Hodgson began to collect Sanskrit manuscripts that would 
soon become renowned throughout Europe as the original scriptures of Buddhism. Indeed, cast 
away from the European academy, Hodgson knew that he enjoyed the unprecedented 
opportunity, unimaginable for British, French, and German Orientalists, to gain first-hand 
knowledge of Buddhism in the Newar community of Nepal. In learning that the scriptures of the 
Newars were written in the sacred language of India, he became aware of the importance of the 
task at hand. However, the basic training in Sanskrit Hodgson received in Calcutta was not 
sufficient to read or translate Buddhist books. The scriptures had to be sent to Europe, to be 
studied by the scientific methods of Oriental philology. 
Between 1827 and 1845, Hodgson shipped from Nepal a total of 144 volumes containing 
423 manuscripts of Sanskrit Buddhist works. Of these, 66 were originally given to the library of 
Fort William in Calcutta, and then moved to the library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. 
Furthermore 94 volumes, among which copies made for the occasion, were directly shipped to 
the library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Between 1835 and 1836, 79 were sent to the Royal 
Asiatic Society of London, 30 to the library of London’s India Office, and 7 to Oxford’s 
Bodleian Library. Moreover, a first shipment of 24 volumes of original manuscripts in 1836, and 
a second shipment of 64 volumes of copies in 1837, were sent to the Société Asiatique. Finally, 
upon a private request by Burnouf, Hodgson sent 59 additional volumes to him personally the 
following year. The manuscripts deposited in Calcutta and in London were neglected by scholars 
for decades, while the first 88, and then the remaining 59 which reached Paris, met with a 
different destiny in Burnouf’s hands.12 
In 1837, by the time Burnouf received the first case of the Sanskrit collection at the 
Société Asiatique in Paris,13 two recent works had become particularly renowned for their 
unprecedented detail in discussing Buddhist doctrine. The first, compiled in Asia, was 
Hodgson’s 1828 “Sketch of Buddhism, derived from the Bauddha writings of Nepál.”14 The 
                                                            
12 For the complete list of the manuscripts collected by Hodgson, compiled by F. M. Müller, see “Appendix 
A” in Hunter (1896, p. 337). 
13 As Burnouf received the shipment that contained the first twenty-four volumes of Sanskrit manuscripts, 
the case contained seven of the nine scriptures of the Navadharma, that is, the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, 
the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra, the Lalitavistara Sūtra, the Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra, the Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra, the 
Samādhirāja Sūtra, and the Tathāgataguhyaka, otherwise known as Guhyasamāja Tantra, while it also contained 
other works such as the Durgatipariśodhanī Tantra, the Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra, the Mahākāla Tantra, the 
Gītapustaka Tantra, the Pratyaṅgirā Dhāraṇī, the Dhāraṇī Saṃgraha, the Kāraṇḍavyūha, as well as the 
Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha and the Svayambhūpurāṇa, that are central to the Buddhism of the Newar community. See 
Hunter (1896, p. 353). 
14 On Hodgson’s works that Burnouf employed as his sources, see Hodgson (1828, 1829, 1971). The 
complete list of the 144 Sanskrit volumes had become available to the European public in 1828 in Hodgson’s 
“Sketch of Buddhism, derived from the Bauddha writings of Nepál.” Here, Hodgson’s “List of Sanskrit Bauddha 
Works” presents a twofold division of Buddhist scriptures that echoes Deshauterayes’s twofold division of Buddhist 
doctrine into an inner and an external form: “Purāṇas or Exoteric works” and “Tantras or Esoteric Works.” His first 
list of 70 manuscripts, under the heading of “Purāṇas or Exoteric Works,” includes several among the most 
influential scriptures of Buddhism throughout Asia: six versions of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra; the Laṇkāvatāra 
Sūtra, important for the Yogācāra and tathāgatagarbha doctrines; the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, among the most 
popular of Buddhist scriptures; the Lalitavistara Sūtra, a biography of the Buddha; the Divyāvadāna, or legends 
from the former lives of the Buddha; the Aśokāvadāna, source of stories about King Aśoka, the “enlightened ruler” 
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second, entitled Geschichte der Ost-Mongolen (“History of the Eastern Mongols”), was 
published in 1829 in Saint Petersburg by the Dutch-Moravian Mongolist Isaac Jacob Schmidt 
(1779-1847), later known for his translation of the Vajracchedikā, or Diamond Sūtra from 
Tibetan into German. From both works, Burnouf writes, it was possible to know in detail the 
“metaphysics of Buddhism.” Yet, Burnouf finally engaged in a deeper way only with Hodgson’s 
essays. For, unlike Schmidt, who had relied on Mongolian sources, Hodgson had described 
Buddhist doctrine by employing the same original Sanskrit works that the French scholar would 
now employ as sources to write the history of Buddhist philosophy in India. 
As Burnouf writes in his July 5, 1837, letter to Hodgson, after the first twenty-four 
volumes were received in Paris, the Société Asiatique selected the first manuscripts to be 
examined by Burnouf and one of his students, the young Belgian scholar Eugène Jacquet (1811-
1838). Burnouf was assigned four scriptures, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra, or the Lotus Sūtra, 
the Samādhirāja Sūtra, and the Kāraṇḍavyūha Sūtra. Initially, he also examined the 
Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, but finding its linguistic form difficult, he decided to 
postpone its reading and dedicate his first extensive study to the Lotus Sūtra.15 Entranced by the 
parables and by the preaching of the Buddha to his disciples, Burnouf began his translation, 
along with an additional project of publishing what at this early stage he called an “analysis or 
some observations on the Saddharma pundarȋka.”16 
By October 1837, 233 of the 248 folios of the scripture had been translated. In July 1839, 
once the translation was complete, Burnouf began to look after the aspects of printing. But the 
European public, he thought, was not yet prepared to appreciate such “little known and often also 
bizarre” work. Setting aside the index and the notes, this peculiar book needed an introductory 
essay. In the next three years, Burnouf would thus write his Introduction, which, in the 
meantime, he came to conceive of as only the first of a series of volumes on the history of 
Buddhism in India. To be sure, it is during these three years, from 1841 to 1844, that Burnouf 
developed his theory about the original teaching of the Buddha: the moral philosophy of the 
“simple sūtras.” For, Burnouf read the scriptures contained in Hodgson’s second and third 
dispatches of 1837 only as he prepared the translation of the Lotus Sūtra, when he began the 
comparative work of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka with other scriptures of the collection. Once the 
Introduction was published, he sent a copy to Hodgson, who in 1844 had resigned from his 
position as British resident in Nepal and had briefly returned to England. 
On February 16, 1852, in what is probably his last letter to Hodgson, Burnouf writes that 
the final revision of his French translation of the Lotus Sūtra, based on a second manuscript, was 
about to be completed. As the notes and the appendices on the Lotus Sūtra grew in number, the 
volume’s length reached 808 pages, which would then be supplemented by extensive tables and 
indexes. The final, monumental edition of the text, of 897 pages, was edited and published the 
same year, four months after Burnouf’s untimely death, by his student Julius Von Mohl (1800-
1876), with the title Le Lotus de la bonne loi traduit du Sanscrit accompagné d’un commentaire 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
of Buddhism; the Jātakamālā, or stories from the previous lives of the Buddha; the Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra, the 
foundational scripture of the Pure Land schools in East Asia; the Guhyasamāja  Tantra, among the most highly 
regarded tantras; and the Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra, one of the Navadharma, the nine scriptures held in the highest 
regard by the Buddhists of Nepal. The second class of scriptures in Hodgson’s list, identifying the “Tantras or 
Esoteric Works,” included 74 volumes, among which the Hevajra Tantra, the Saṃvara Tantra, the Vajrasattva 
Tantra, the Tārā Tantra, the Mahākāla Tantra, and the Kālacakra Tantra. 
15 For Burnouf’s reception of the Lotus Sūtra, see Lopez (2016). 
16 See Feer (1889, p. 159). My translation. In his early correspondence with Hodgson, at least in Feer’s 
publication of his letters, Burnouf does not always employ Sanskrit diacritics. Compare with Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. 
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et de vingt et un mémoires relatifs au Buddhisme (“The Lotus of the Good Law, translated from 
Sanskrit, accompanied by a Commentary and by Twenty-One Memoirs about Buddhism”). 
Burnouf set the aim of the Introduction at the beginning of the book, divided into five 
“memorandums.” Here, after presenting the results of his preliminary observations, he states that 
the main objective of his study was to determine whether the works of the collection attributed to 
the Buddha had all been written in the same epoch. Thus in the “Second Memorandum,” that is 
the next section of the Introduction, he would shed light on the early period of Buddhism, 
“offering the most characteristic features of the picture of India’s social and religious state at the 
moment of the preaching of Śākyamuni Buddha.”17 But this memorandum, the study of the 
Sanskrit collection of Nepal, would only be the first of a series. In another memorandum, to be 
published after the 1844 Introduction, Burnouf planned to conduct a similar study for the Pāli 
collection of Ceylon, in order to assess the period of the Buddhist councils, when the doctrines 
preached by the Buddha were said to have reached the form in which they were later written. 
Burnouf would then write a final memorandum to compare the results of the studies of 
both collections of Nepal and Ceylon. That is to say, it would be in this final comparison of the 
two collections of scriptures of Nepal and Ceylon, which Burnouf came to call of the North and 
of the South, that he would cast light on the epoch of the preaching of Śākyamuni. And by 
comparing different chronologies about the historical date of the Buddha’s death found in the 
Tibetan and Pāli scriptures, he would make a final choice as to the most convincing date. The 
result of the comparison would thus show, Burnouf writes, that the “fundamental and truly 
antique elements of Buddhism must be sought in what the two Indian redactions of the religious 
books, that of the North, which uses Sanskrit, and that of the South, which uses Pāli, have kept in 
common.”18 Indeed, previous insight into the story of the Buddha’s last days in the Pāli 
scriptures of Ceylon helped Burnouf identify similar themes in the Sanskrit collection of Nepal 
that he would conceive as the earliest historical kernel of the Buddha’s doctrine. 
 
 
II 
 
If Burnouf’s image of the Buddha and of his teaching could be described in a few words, 
they could be illustrated by his following description of the sūtra class of scriptures: “Written 
generally in a form and a language that is quite simple, the sūtras retain the visible traces of their 
origin. They are dialogues related to morality and philosophy, in which Śākya fulfills the role of 
master.”19 As he introduces his readers to these dialogues related to morality and philosophy, in 
the first section of the Second Memorandum of the Introduction Burnouf offers a general 
description of the collection. Here he provides his own interpretation of the various categories 
contained in the collections of Tibetan and Nepalese scriptures already discussed in previous 
essays by Hodgson, but also by the Transylvanian scholar Alexander Csoma de Kőrös (1784-
1842), in his summary of the Tibetan canon, published between 1836 and 1839 in the Journal of 
the Asiatic Studies of Bengal.20 
                                                            
17 See Burnouf (2010, p. 79). 
18 Ibid. (p. 86). 
19 Ibid. (p. 155). 
20 The first section of Csoma’s work, the “Analysis of the Dulva, a Portion of the Tibetan Work entitled the 
Kah-Gyur,” commented on the Buddhist scriptures on monastic discipline, the first division of the Tibetan canon; 
the second section, the “Analysis of the Sher-chin—P’hal-chen—Dkon-séks—Do-de—Nyáng-das—and Gyut; 
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Having found most convincing in Hodgson’s and in Csoma’s essays the division of the 
Buddhist teachings called tripiṭaka, or “three baskets”—that is, sūtra, or the discourses of the 
Buddha, vinaya, or discipline, and abhidharma, or, as he rendered the term, “metaphysics”—he 
organized his analysis of the Nepalese collection in the central section of the Introduction 
according to these three categories. He then placed his analysis of the books called tantras and of 
the commentaries after the three chapters forming the bulk of the volume. It is in the second 
section that deals with the sūtras that we see Burnouf painting his own image of Buddhism as a 
simple moral philosophy. In particular, Burnouf’s idea of what must constitute the original, most 
antique, elements in the Buddha’s teaching, takes shape in his analysis of the sūtra class of 
scriptures—more precisely, in the distinction he makes between those which he calls the 
“simple” and the “developed” sūtras. While Burnouf assesses the developed sūtras and the 
tantras in the later chapters of his work, it is the idea of what he calls a “simple sūtra” that shaped 
his interpretation of the other categories of the Sanskrit collection. Once identified, the content of 
a “simple sūtra” would help Burnouf distinguish the philosophical portions of Buddhist doctrine 
from the religious rituals and ceremonies, but it would also serve as the basis for his later 
evaluation of the tantras as the most idolatrous scriptures of the entire collection.21 
In Burnouf’s analysis, the sūtra category could be explained in relation to the titles of 
different scriptures found in the collection: (1) the sūtras, (2) the mahāyāna sūtras, or sūtras of 
the Great Vehicle, and (3) the mahāvaipulya sūtras, or, as he called them, sūtras of “great 
development.” But, setting aside the translation of the Diamond Sūtra by Schmidt, no sample of 
these sūtras had been published in a European language. To make his point, Burnouf thus had to 
provide fragments of different types of sūtras in his own translation from Sanskrit. “I thus have 
chosen from the great Nepalese collection, known by the title Divyāvadāna,” he continues, “two 
fragments in which I have recognized all the characteristics of the real sūtras, focusing, in order 
to make this choice, on the subject itself rather than on the title these fragments bear in the 
aforementioned collection.”22  
In his quest for scriptural fragments that portrayed the subject of the Buddha’s “real 
sūtras,” that is, the discourses that Burnouf believed to have been truly spoken by the Buddha, 
the twenty-four scriptures he received in Hodgson’s first shipment, including the Lotus Sūtra, did 
not meet his standard. For, despite his earlier choice of the Lotus Sūtra, abounding in moral tales 
but also exceeding in magical formulas, now his selection of scriptural fragments with the 
characteristics of the “real sūtras” had fallen on the Divyāvadāna (“Divine Legends”), a 
collection of thirty-eight narratives illustrating Buddhist virtues, the law of cause and effect, and 
aspects of cosmology. Each legend in the collection recounts the deeds of a different protagonist, 
at times the Buddha, at other times a disciple, in the present and in former lives. The Buddha 
illustrates the topic of the legend, such as the virtues of offering or almsgiving, through his 
recollection of the protagonist’s deeds in a remote past. By means of this recollection, the 
Buddha then connects the past deeds with the protagonist’s present condition. Hence the Buddha 
exhorts his disciples to cultivate the moral virtue that is the main topic of the legend.  
As for the manuscript of the Divyāvadāna, it was part of the Nepalese collection of 
Sanskrit books that Hodgson shipped to Paris. In his early essays, Hodgson listed avadāna, along 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
being the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th divisions of the Tibetan Work, entitled the Kah-gyur,” examined the remaining 
six canonical divisions. 
21 For the way in which Burnouf related the simple sūtras with the other sūtra categories of scriptures in the 
Nepalese Collection, including the mahāyāna sūtras and the vaipulya sūtras, see Dibeltulo (2015, pp. 111-14). 
22 Ibid. (p. 117). 
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with sūtra, as one of the classes of the twelvefold division of scripture adopted in Nepal. Yet, the 
Divyāvadāna was never translated into Tibetan or Chinese as a collection bearing this title. The 
majority of the stories appear in the monastic codes preserved in the Tibetan and Chinese 
scriptural collections. Indeed, these stories resemble the stories told in the Mūlasarvāstivāda 
vinaya, the largest extant monastic code compiled in Sanskrit in the early centuries of the 
common era. But the extant Sanskrit manuscript of the Divyāvadāna, upon which Burnouf based 
his analysis, traces back to the seventeenth century, to the work of a Nepalese compiler. Even 
though the legends contained in the Divyāvadāna date to the early centuries of the common era, 
the collection itself may be a late and local compilation in Nepal.23 Burnouf however assumed 
the legends of the Divyāvadāna to have been compiled in the extant form by the immediate 
disciples of the Buddha. Furthermore, his undertaking was complicated, but also enabled, by the 
fact that, among the thirty-eight texts of the collection, thirty-six were styled as avadānas, and 
only two as sutras: the Prātihārya Sūtra and the Dānādhikaraṇamahāyāna Sūtra.24 In Burnouf’s 
opinion, the subject of the former clearly did not reflect its title, while the latter, styled as a 
mahāyāna sūtra, could be regarded neither as a sūtra nor as an avadāna, for it only consisted of a 
concise enumeration of the thirty-seven ways to practice the virtue of almsgiving.25 The original 
teaching of the Buddha, the simple moral philosophy shielded from mythical, legendary, and 
supernatural elements, thus lay not, in Burnouf’s scientific imagination, in the only two 
scriptures of the collection that the Nepalese compilers had styled as sūtras, but elsewhere. 
 
 
III 
 
Burnouf’s study of what he called the “simple sūtras” began from his comparison of two 
different fragments from the Divyāvadāna. The two fragments were what he presented as the 
“Sūtra of Māndhātṛ” and the “Sūtra of Kanakavarṇa.” The legend of Māndhātṛ began with the 
Buddha’s dialogue with Ānanda, his beloved first cousin and attendant, and with the god Māra, a 
key figure of the Buddhist pantheon that Burnouf described as the “demon of love, of sin, and of 
                                                            
23 For a history of the Nepalese manuscripts of the Divyāvadāna, see Hiraoka (1998) and Rotman (2008). 
For further research on the manuscript editions of the Divyāvadāna, see Cowell and Neil (1886) and Silk (2008a), 
(2008b). 
24 The Prātihārya Sūtra, renowned for the Buddha’s miracle at the city of Śrāvastī, told of Śākyamuni’s 
display of magical powers before a large public assembly. Challenged by six heretics, the Buddha accepted king 
Prasenajit of Kośala’s invitation to perform a miracle beyond ordinary human comprehension. Before a large 
gathering, the Buddha became absorbed in meditation. Having disappeared from his seat, he then rose in the sky, 
making four replicas of his body. Each replica then emanated lights of different colors. Taking turns, each buddha 
then set the lower body ablaze and rained showers of fresh water from the upper body. Having withdrawn this 
miracle, the Buddha then crossed his legs and sat on a magically created lotus throne. Finally, to make his powers 
visible to the entire world, the Buddha emanated an array of magically created replicas, filling the skies of buddha 
images up to the Akaniṣṭha heaven. It was only then that the Buddha set forth his discourse, causing thousands of 
beings to take refuge, while establishing thousands of others in various stages of attainment of the truths of his 
teaching. In Burnouf’s opinion, the subject of the Prātihārya Sūtra clearly did not reflect its title. Hence the 
scripture was neither what he termed a “real sūtra,” nor was it, to judge from its subject, an avadāna. Unlike the 
other avadānas, where the Buddha narrated the deeds of a protagonist in a remote past, the Prātihārya Sūtra reported 
the miracle at Śrāvastī entirely in the present tense. Likewise, although the Dānādhikaraṇamahāyāna Sūtra was the 
only text in the collection styled as a mahāyāna sūtra, Burnouf did not regard this scripture as a sūtra, nor as an 
avadāna. Unlike the Prātihārya Sūtra, this scripture did not unfold in narrative form. See Rotman (2008). 
25 For the Japanese translation of the collection see Hiraoka (2007). For an analysis of the corpus of the 
Divyāvadāna and a partial English translation of the tales see Rotman (2008). 
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death; … the tempter and enemy of the Buddha.”26 The preamble of the scripture, set in the city 
of Vaiśāli toward the end of the Buddha’s life, opened with the Buddha’s decision to enter 
parinirvāṇa. Having completed the round of alms in the morning, the Buddha and Ānanda 
arranged their bowls and robes and set out from the city. The sage and his cousin thus walked to 
the Cāpāla caitya, a shrine in whose vicinity they sought shelter for the afternoon rest. After 
sitting under the trunk of a tree, the Buddha addressed Ānanda, expressing how beautiful, he 
thought, were the caityas of Vaiśāli, including that of Cāpāla, of Saptāmraka, of Bahupattraka, of 
Gautamanyagrodha, of Dhurānikṣepana, and of Makuṭabandhana, as well as the forest of śāla 
trees, and, indeed, Jambudvīpa in its entirety. The Buddha then explained to Ānanda that by 
means of his magical powers he, the tathāgata, could have removed the causes of a short life. 
The tathāgata, if requested to do so, could use magic to defer death. 
These magical powers derived from the Buddha’s meditative absorption on the catvāra 
ṛddhipāda, in Sanskrit the “four foundations of magical power.” The ṛddhipādas are the four 
qualities that, if cultivated with diligence, endow a tathāgata not only with the mastery of 
magical powers—so that he possesses the ability to perform a vast range of miraculous feats—, 
but also with the final success of awakening—the power to extinguish the āsravas, in English the 
contaminants, or the mental afflictions, at the root of saṃsāra. The cultivation of the ṛddhipādas 
corresponds to the Buddha’s meditative absorption on the four mental qualities of aspiration (S. 
chanda), thought (S. citta), effort (S. vīrya), and analysis (S. mīmāṃsā), in association with the 
mental factors that lead to the abandonment of the contaminants.27 
In Sanskrit literature, reference to the four ṛddhipādas is made in the Arthaviniścaya 
Sūtra, where the Buddha explains the main formulas of Buddhist doctrine in twenty-six chapters. 
The formula concerning the ṛddhipādas, where the Buddha teaches the way to cultivate the four 
qualities of aspiration, thought, effort, and analysis, occurs in the sixteenth chapter, entitled 
“Catvāra ṛddhipādaḥ.”28 However, it is in the Saṃyutta Nikāya (“Connected Discourses”), the 
third of the five collections of the Pāli Suttapiṭaka of Sri Lanka, that the ṛddhipādas (P. 
                                                            
26 See Burnouf (2010, p. 120n). 
27 In the traditional presentation of the qualities of a buddha’s mind, the four ṛddhipādas are regarded as 
one of seven groups of factors collectively known as the bodhipākṣikadharma, or “wings of awakening.” This is a 
list of thirty-seven factors pertaining to a buddha’s awakened mind—a list which includes the four foundations of 
mindfulness (S. smṛtyupasthāna), the four right abandonments (S. samyakprahāṇa), the four bases of magical 
powers, the five faculties (S. indriya), the five powers (S. bala), the seven factors of awakening (S. bodhyaṅga), and 
the eightfold path of the nobles (S. āryāṣṭāṅgamārga), regarded as Śākyamuni’s earliest teaching. For a detailed 
presentation of the bodhipākṣikadharma in Sanskrit and Pāli sources, and specifically of the four ṛddhipāda, see in 
particular Gethin (2001, pp. 81-103). 
28 For the Sanskrit version of the Arthaviniścaya, see the studies by Alfonsa Ferrari (1944) and by N. H. 
Samtani (2005), and the translation from Sanskrit into English by Samtani (2002). The sixteenth chapter of the 
Arthaviniścaya reads as follows: “(16) catvāra ṛddhipādāḥ. tatra bhikṣavaḥ katame catvāra ṛddhipādāḥ. (1) idha 
bhikṣavo bhikṣuś chanda-samādhi-prahāṇa-saṃskāra-samanvāgatam-ṛddhipādaṃ bhāvayati viveka niśritaṃ 
virāganiśritaṃ nirodhaniśritaṃ vyavasarga pariṇataṃ; ātmachandho nātilīno bhāviṣyati nātipragṛhītaḥ. (2) vīrya-
samādhi-prahāṇa-saṃskāra-samanvāgatam-ṛddhipādaṃ bhāvayati viveka niśritaṃ virāganiśritaṃ nirodhaniśritaṃ 
vyavasarga pariṇataṃ; ātmachandho nātilīno bhāviṣyati nātipragṛhītaḥ. (3) citta-samādhi-prahāṇa-saṃskāra-
samanvāgatam-ṛddhipādaṃ bhāvayati viveka niśritaṃ virāganiśritaṃ nirodhaniśritaṃ vyavasarga pariṇataṃ; 
ātmachandho nātilīno bhāviṣyati nātipragṛhītaḥ. (4) mimāṃsā-samādhi-prahāṇa-saṃskāra-samanvāgatam-
ṛddhipādaṃ bhāvayati viveka niśritaṃ virāganiśritaṃ nirodhaniśritaṃ vyavasarga pariṇataṃ; ātmachandho 
nātilīno bhāviṣyati nātipragṛhītaḥ. Ime bhikṣavaś catvāra ṛddhipādāḥ” (in Samtani, 2005, pp. 30-1). On the Pāli 
version of this passage see note XX, and Feer (1960, 254). For an analysis of the “viveka niśritaṃ virāganiśritaṃ 
nirodhaniśritaṃ vyavasarga pariṇataṃ; ātmachandho nātilīno bhāviṣyati nātipragṛhītaḥ” formula in the Sanskrit 
version, whose presence is the major difference with the Pāli rendering of the four iddhipāda, see Gethin (2001, pp. 
92-94). 
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iddhipāda) are covered in greater detail. The Buddha’s statements concerning the iddhipādas are 
collected in the seventh chapter of the Mahāvagga, the fifth book of the Saṃyutta Nikāya, 
entitled Iddhipādasaṃyutta (“Connected Discourses on the Foundations of Magical Powers”).29 
A Pāli version of the sixteenth chapter of the Arthaviniścaya Sūtra appears, despite minor 
differences, in the seventh chapter of the Mahāvagga, the fifth book of the Saṃyutta Nikāya, 
entitled Iddhipādasaṃyutta (“Connected Discourses on the Foundations of Magical Powers”). 
Here, in the first subsection of the “Cāpāla” vagga, entitled “Aparā” (From the Near Shore), the 
Buddha says: 
 
Monks, these four foundations of magical power, if developed and cultivated, lead to going from 
the near shore to the far shore. What are the four? Here, monks, a monk develops the foundation 
of magical power that is endowed with the meditation on aspiration, together with the forces of 
abandonment. He develops the foundation of magical power that is endowed with the meditation 
on thought, together with the forces of abandonment. He develops the foundation of magical 
power that is endowed with the meditation on effort, together with the forces of abandonment. He 
develops the foundation of magical power that is endowed with the meditation on analysis, 
together with the forces of abandonment. These four foundations of magical power, monks, if 
developed and cultivated, lead to going from the near shore to the far shore.30 
 
It is clear, from the Iddhipādasaṃyutta, that the Buddha regarded the cultivation of the 
iddhipādas as the cornerstone to the complete abandonment of the contaminants, in Pāli āsava, 
resulting in the arhat’s attainment of the final goal of nirvāṇa and in liberation from saṃsāra.  
Success in the development of the four ṛddhipādas resulted in the eightfold ṛddhi (P. iddhi) or 
magical powers. In Pāli literature, the Buddha teaches the eightfold ṛddhi as the first item in a list 
of six abhijñās (Pāli abhiññās), in English “direct knowledges” or “superknowledges.” For 
instance, in the Majjhima Nikāya (“Middle Length Discourses”), the second collection of the 
Suttapiṭaka, the Buddha teaches the six abhiññās in the sixth sutta entitled Ākankheyya Sutta.31 A 
more elaborate list however appears in the section entitled “Pubbe, Hetu” (“Formerly, 
Conditions”) of the “Pāsādakampana” division of the Iddhipādasaṃyutta. 32 Here, the Buddha, in 
his recollection of the causes and conditions by means of which he developed the four 
iddhipādas during his former career as a bodhisattva, teaches the six abhiññās as the fruit of the 
foundations of magical power.33  
                                                            
29 For an English translation of the Iddhipādasaṃyutta, see Bodhi (2000, pp. 1717-1749) and Woodward 
(1965, pp. 225-260). For the Pāli text see Feer (1960, pp. 254-293). 
30 See Bodhi (2000, p. 1718) and Woodward (1965, pp. 225-226), modified. For the Pāli, see Feer (1960, p. 
254). 
31 For the Ākankheyya Sutta, see Bodhi (1995, pp. 115-117). 
32 See Bodhi (2000, pp. 1726-1728), (Woodward 1965, pp. 235-238). For the Pāli, see Feer (1960, pp. 263-
266). 
33 The first superknowledge of unrestrained bodily action has eight aspects: (1) the ability to make replicas 
of one’s body, (2) the ability to appear and vanish at will, (3) the ability to pass unhindered through solid objects, (4) 
the ability to sink into the ground, (5) the ability to walk on water, (6) the ability to sit cross-legged and fly through 
the air like a bird, (7) the ability to touch the sun and moon with one’s hand, and (8) the ability to ascend to the 
world of Brahmā. For the first abhiññā as the Buddha preaches it in the Ākankheyya Sutta, see Bodhi (1995, p. 116); 
for the version of the first abhiññā in the Iddhipādasaṃyutta, see Bodhi (2000, p. 1727), Woodward (1965, p. 236), 
and Feer (1960, pp. 264-265). In turn, the remaining five superknowledges are: (2) knowledge of the divine ear, (3) 
knowledge of others’ thoughts, (4) knowledge of past lives, (5) knowledge of the divine eye, and (6) knowledge of 
the destruction of contaminants. For the remaining five abhiññās in the Ākankheyya Sutta, see Bodhi (1995, pp. 116-
17); for the longer version of the remaining five abhiññā in the Iddhipādasaṃyutta, see Bodhi (2000, pp. 1727-
1728), Woodward (1965, pp. 237-238), and Feer (1960, pp. 265-266). The abhiññās are described in detail in the 
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The first five superknowledges are said to belong to the world (S. laukika): humans and 
gods, Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike, can obtain them by means of the proper meditative 
absorptions. Only the sixth superknowledge grants a power whose domain reaches beyond the 
world (S. lokottara). Through the cultivation of the eightfold path, an arhat thus permanently 
extinguishes the contaminants, thereby attaining nirvāṇa. The Buddha could then be said to 
inhabit the world as a human being, yet also to have reached beyond it, for he had permanently 
destroyed the causes of rebirth in the world by the sixth superknowledge. The Buddha’s 
cultivation of the four foundations of magical powers and of the eightfold path thus 
accomplished the goal of the awakened in this world and beyond it. The cultivation of the former 
contributed to the achievement of the latter. Yet the eightfold path leading to the extinction of the 
contaminants was achieved simultaneously by means of the four foundations of magical power.34 
The four ṛddhipādas therefore not only resulted in the attainment of the first 
superknowledge, that is, the fivefold ṛddhi of unrestrained bodily action, but were also said to 
confer upon the Buddha the power to extinguish the causes of a short lifespan. “So he can live,” 
the Buddha told Ānanda, as Burnouf continued in his rendering of the “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ,” “if 
so requested, either for a full kalpa, or until the end of the kalpa.”35 After the Buddha spoke thus, 
however, Ānanda remained silent. The Buddha repeated the same formula for a second time, and 
a third. And still, Ānanda did not take the Buddha’s hint. The hindrance in Ānanda’s 
understanding, the Buddha thought, must have been the demonic work of Māra. So while 
Ānanda sought refuge under the trunk of another tree, Māra approached the Buddha, addressing 
him as the sugata, in English “well gone.” The time for the sugata to enter parinirvāṇa, said the 
god, had come. Māra thus recalled how in the past, right after the Buddha had attained 
awakening under the bodhi tree, he had already approached the Buddha, asking him to depart 
from the world.  
At that time, Māra continued, the Buddha replied that he would not have done so until the 
ordained and lay disciples of both sexes had purified their views, had been well instructed in his 
teaching, and until they had propagated it among humans and gods. Now that time, said Māra, 
had come. The Buddha could not disagree, so he kept his promise. Three months would suffice, 
the Buddha told the god, to bring his endeavor to fruit. The Buddha thus entered meditative 
absorption, concentrating on his life forces, and renounced the thought of using his magical 
powers to defer death. Pleased by the Buddha’s resolution, Māra vanished with no trace. A series 
of omens then occurred, including a great trembling of the earth. Ānanda, startled by the quake, 
ran to the Buddha, to ask him about its cause. The Buddha explained the eight causes of 
earthquakes, the eighth being a tathāgata’s imminent entrance into final nirvāṇa. Ānanda thus 
recalled the Buddha’s discussion on the tathāgata’s ability to defer death. And so he asked the 
Buddha to use his magical powers. But it was too late. It had been Ānanda’s fault, the Buddha 
told his cousin, his mind hindered by Māra, not to have requested the tathāgata to remain in the 
world on the proper occasion. 
So the Buddha gathered the monastic community at the Cāpāla caitya to deliver what 
would be his last teaching in the city of Vaiśāli. “All compounds, O monks, are perishable;” 
Burnouf translated, “they do not endure; one cannot rely on them with confidence; their 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
twelfth and thirteenth chapter of Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga, entitled respectively “Iddhividha Niddesa” and 
“Abhiññā-niddesa.” See Ñyāṇamoli (1964, pp. 409-478). 
34 The Buddha makes the point of how a monk who cultivates the ṛddhipādas tends to nirvāṇa in various 
passages throughout the Iddhipādasaṃyutta. See for example the fourth section of the Iddhipādasaṃyutta entitled 
“Gaṅgāpeyyāli” in Feer (1960, pp. 290-291). 
35 See Burnouf (2010, p. 119). 
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condition is change; so that it is not fitting to conceive anything about what is compounded nor is 
it fitting to take pleasure in it.”36 Even the Buddha, the holiest of beings, having relinquished his 
magical powers to prolong his life, was subjected to the compound nature of things. He was 
therefore subjected to change, impermanence, and death. Thus the time had come when he would 
leave the world. The Buddha instructed his disciples to collect and understand his teachings, to 
preserve, accept, and disseminate them through the world of humans and gods. These teachings 
consisted in the practices of the bodhipākṣikadharma, that is, the thirty-seven wings of 
awakening that feature the four ṛddhipādas. 
The Buddha thus walked with Ānanda towards a grove near Vaiśāli, to announce his 
decision: three months later he would enter into parinirvāṇa. As he said so, the divine 
inhabitants of the grove shed tears, producing an abundant rain. Having heard of the Buddha’s 
decision, several hundred thousand beings gathered in his presence. The mere hearing of his 
words caused these beings to reach various levels in the truths of his teaching. It was 
extraordinary, the Buddha proclaimed before the assembly, that he had thus fulfilled his role of 
teacher, he who in former times had been “spiteful, passionate, given to error, in no way free, 
slave to the conditions of birth, old age, sickness, death, grief, pain, distress, disquiet, 
misfortune.”37 It had been at the moment of death, in his former life as the king named Māndhātṛ, 
that he had made a prayer to accomplish the present result. “May several thousand creatures, 
after having abandoned the condition of householders, and embraced the religious life under the 
direction of the ṛṣis, after having meditated on the four fortunate abodes of the Brahmās, and 
renounced the passion that draws men to pleasure, may, I say, these thousands of creatures be 
reborn in the participation of the world of Brahmā and become its numerous inhabitants!”38 
Thus, for Burnouf, did the “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ” end. Yet the Buddha’s discourse only 
seemed to have ended where the legend had begun. Burnouf rendered into French only the 
preamble of the avadāna. He left the main portion of the text, and the conclusion, untranslated. 
Notably, he presented this fragment to the learned European public as the “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ,” 
and not as the “Avadāna of Māndhātṛ.” Even though it may appear that he changed the title of 
the latter into the former, in fact he did not do so. In order to say that there was a “Sūtra of 
Māndhātṛ,” Burnouf had to make a distinction. The subject of the avadāna could thus be said to 
consist of two parts: the Buddha’s discourse in the preamble, that is, the simple moral story of 
the Buddha’s decision to enter final nirvāṇa—narrated in the present tense, at the time and in the 
setting of Śākyamuni’s teaching—, and the Buddha’s legendary recollection—narrated in the 
past tense, at the time of the Buddha’s former life as king Māndhātṛ. It was thus the preamble, 
and not the central text of the avadāna, that Burnouf called “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ.” It was a sūtra, 
then, or some element traceable to what Burnouf regarded as a sūtra, that he saw in the preamble, 
despite the fact that the scripture bore the title of avadāna. Hence the sūtra that Burnouf termed 
simple was this “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ.” It was a historical fragment of the avadāna of Māndhātṛ. 
The remaining, untranslated part, Burnouf clarified, was in many respects similar to the 
Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra. Like the Lotus Sūtra, the central narrative of the avadāna of 
Māndhātṛ abounded in legendary and superhuman elements. Still, in his selection of the textual 
fragment that served as the “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ,” Burnouf did not seem to consider the 
ṛddhipādas, Māra, or the deferment of death as superhuman elements. 
                                                            
36 Ibid. (p. 126). 
37 Ibid. (p. 119). 
38 Ibid. (p. 129). 
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Burnouf explained the relation between the text and its title in a simple way. The 
Buddhist compilers of the Divyāvadāna, who, he thought, were the early disciples of the Buddha, 
must have attached more importance to the legend of Māndhātṛ than to the Buddha’s decision to 
enter final nirvāṇa. These early compilers, therefore, must have entitled the legend after the 
king’s name, and not after the events of the Buddha’s last days. They must have styled the 
narrative as an avadāna because of its legendary content, and not based on what Burnouf 
recognized as its authentic, historical content. “Perhaps also the preference that they accorded 
here to legend over history,” he observed, “comes from the fact that the last years of the life of 
the Buddha are recounted in detail in other books.”39 After all, the Buddhist compilers of the 
Divyāvadāna may have thought of it as a necessity to entitle the text after the story of the 
Buddha’s resolution to leave the world. Indeed, as it will become clear below, Burnouf formed 
his idea of the historical events of the Buddha’s last days from his knowledge of one of these 
“other books.”  
In sum, in Burnouf’s opinion, only the preamble of the legend of Māndhātṛ presented 
authentic content—historical elements traceable to the epoch of Śākyamuni’s simple moral 
teaching. Burnouf admitted that the Buddha’s dialogue with Ānanda and Māra was indeed 
marked by the Buddha’s reference to his superhuman powers. Still, it was possible to perceive in 
the preamble a series of historical facts tracing to Śākyamuni’s human life. Indeed, it was the 
Buddha’s simple discourse on the truth of impermanence at the moment he announced his own 
death—“All compounds, O monks, are perishable”—that made him, in Burnouf’s eyes, the 
respected human teacher of a simple moral philosophy: the philosopher of the simple sūtras. 
The issue of the simple sūtras, then, concerned the definition of Śākyamuni’s human life. 
This definition issued from what Burnouf doubted and from what he believed. For the first time 
in the study of Buddhism, Burnouf analyzed the Buddha’s mind to imagine this mind as the mind 
of a historical human being. Burnouf described the Buddha’s mind as the mind of a respected, 
historical human teacher, depriving him of the qualities of a mahāpuruṣa, the superman of 
Buddhist scriptures. Put another way, Burnouf removed the Buddha’s divine elements, that is, 
the powers regarded as the fruition of the six superknowledges, from the historical setting of the 
preaching, which he described based on the scriptural fragments he analyzed. 
With the Nepalese collection of Sanskrit books at hand, Burnouf could now access the 
deeper aspects and the earliest accounts of the Buddha’s mental powers. Notably, it was in the 
legend of Māndhātṛ, that is, in what Burnouf believed to be the earliest core of Buddhist 
scriptures, that the Buddha himself declared to possess the four ṛddhipādas. It was by means of 
the four foundations of magical power that the Buddha here claimed to be able to remove, if 
requested, the causes of a short life. Still, Burnouf doubted that these magical powers belonged 
to Śākyamuni, the human being, a revered historical teacher. For Burnouf, magical powers were 
qualities that, indeed, an ordinary human being simply could not posses. In Burnouf’s terms, 
then, even as he presented for the first time to the European public the Buddha’s claim to possess 
these faculties, the Buddha’s humanity was marked by the absence of magical powers and 
superhuman elements. 
In a note on his French rendering of the four ṛddhipādas in the preamble of the legend of 
Māndhātṛ, Burnouf admitted his inability to understand, and to correctly translate the term. “I 
cannot,” he observed, “in the absence of a commentary, flatter myself to have rendered these 
formulae well, which are summaries of notions I have not seen elsewhere.”40 In an appendix at 
                                                            
39 Ibid. (p. 130). 
40 Ibid. (p. 119n). 
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the end of the volume, Burnouf resorted to the Vocabulaire Pentaglotte, the famous eighteenth-
century dictionary in five languages (Chinese, Mongolian, Manchu, Tibetan, and Sanskrit) 
commissioned by the Qianlong Emperor (1711-1799), to compare the Sanskrit and Tibetan 
definitions of the term. “The fundamental term,” he noted, “is ṛddhipāda, which the Tibetans 
represent by rdzu ’phrul gyi rkang pa, ‘the foundation of miraculous transformations.’”41 The 
Tibetan definition of the Vocabulaire Pentaglotte thus aided Burnouf in the comprehension of 
the term in the Sanskrit manuscript of the Divyāvadāna. At the conclusion of his philological 
excursus, Burnouf writes: 
 
It results from all this that the Buddhists attribute supernatural faculties to one who has succeeded 
in imagining that he has renounced all ideas of desire, thought, effort, investigation, or meditation, 
that is to say, one who, somehow, has detached himself from all interior operation. Since that is 
hardly possible in the ordinary state of humanity, one understands that those who one believed 
capable of this prodigious detachment could have been taken, by people who believed in the 
possibility of such a power, to be endowed with the power superior to that of a man.42 
 
In Burnouf’s reading, Buddhist compilers believed that Śākyamuni was a person who had 
effectively imagined to have abandoned the four qualities of aspiration, thought, effort, and 
analysis—Burnouf translated the four qualities from Sanskrit into French as “désir” (desire), 
“pensée” (thought), “effort” (effort), and “recherche” (investigation) or “méditation” 
(meditation).43 If the Buddha had renounced all mental activity, the Buddha’s disciples would 
thus say that he had separated himself from “all interior operation.” The Buddha’s magical 
powers thus seemed to Burnouf to derive from this renunciation, or from his detachment. 
Yet Buddhists, in the French scholar’s view, must have only imagined that the Buddha 
possessed such a renunciation. For, in the “ordinary state of humanity,” the achievement of such 
a renunciation, and the superhuman powers it would grant, was highly improbable. Simply put, 
the Buddha could not be endowed with such magical powers. Buddhists, Burnouf believed, must 
have only believed that their teacher had been capable of this fabulous abandonment of all 
mental activity. Therefore, he assumed, the Buddha had been “endowed with the power superior 
to that of a man” by his disciples. Buddhists were thus the “people who believed in the 
possibility of such a power.” And this power, Burnouf believed, was the Buddha’s power of 
“prodigious detachment.” It was therefore Burnouf’s doubt in what Buddhists believed, that is, 
his doubt in their account of the Buddha’s qualities of mind, that defined what he called an 
“ordinary state of humanity.” This is the humanity Burnouf ascribed to Śākyamuni—a human 
teacher who could hardly have possessed, in the domain of the French scholar’s scientific 
imagination, this degree of detachment and, in his view, the magical powers it yielded. 
Hence Burnouf was right about one thing. Lacking commentary, one could not claim to 
have rendered the short Sanskrit definitions of the Vocabulaire Pentaglotte in a satisfactory 
manner. Burnouf’s understanding of the Buddha’s “prodigious detachment” derived from the 
Sanskrit term prahāṇa. His understanding, however, also derived from the grammatical value he 
assigned to the term in the definition of ṛddhipāda from the Vocabulaire Pentaglotte. Here, the 
term prahāṇa appeared in the four Sanskrit formulas that were quoted from such scriptural 
sources as the Arthaviniścaya Sūtra and the Saṃyutta Nikāya. These formulas, each containing 
five words, defined the ṛddhipādas in relation to the four qualities of aspiration, thought, effort, 
                                                            
41 Ibid. (p. 580). 
42 Ibid. (p. 580). 
43 Ibid. (p. 580). See also Burnouf’s French original, in Burnouf (1876, pp. 625-26). 
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and analysis the Buddha chose as the dominant object in the development of meditative 
absorption. This was a deep state of concentration that was also endowed with the “forces of 
abandonment,” namely mental factors leading to the suppression, or abandonment, of the 
contaminants. “The first of these foundations is, for the Vocabulaire Pentaglotte, as for our text,” 
Burnouf observed in his grammatical analysis, “chanda samādhi prahāṇa saṃskāra 
samanvāgata, a compound the examination of the Tibetan version of which allows me to place 
all terms in the following relation: ‘endowed with the conception of renunciation of the 
meditation of desire.’”44 
Thus Burnouf translated prahāṇa in French as “renoncement” (renunciation), “abandon” 
(abandonment), or “détachement” (detachment). Furthermore, he rendered the term saṃskāra as 
“conception,” though the term can also be rendered in English as “factor,” “formation,” or 
“force.” Yet, he provided a particular reading of the grammatical relationships in the compound 
chanda-samādhi-prahāṇa-saṃskāra-samanvāgata that differed entirely from the way of reading 
the formula according to commentary. He placed the two tatpuruṣa compounds chanda-samādhi 
(meditation on desire) and prahāṇa-saṃskāra (forces of abandonment), in turn, in a tatpuruṣa 
relationship, with prahāṇa-saṃskāra in a genitive relationship with chanda-samādhi, rather than 
in apposition with it. Hence, Burnouf did not take both compounds as objects of samanvāgata 
(endowed with) but only the prahāṇa-saṃskāra compound, whose object, in turn, became 
chanda-samādhi. 
Lacking commentary, Burnouf was thus led to interpret the four qualities as objects of 
both the Buddha’s meditative absorption and of his forces of abandonment. But in fact the four 
should have been taken only as objects of the Buddha’s meditative absorption, and not of 
Burnouf’s “conception of renunciation.” In contrast, the objects of the forces of abandonment 
were said to be the contaminants, whose abandonment was granted by the achievement of the 
sixth superknowledge, the knowledge of the elimination of the āsravas. Burnouf thus 
contextualized the qualities of aspiration, thought, effort and analysis in the Vocabulaire 
Pentaglotte’s definition of ṛddhipāda as qualities of mind the Buddha had completely renounced 
in his meditative absorption. He did not consider the alternative reading of the four as objects 
upon which the Buddha claimed to have relied in the development of such an absorption. 
It was the Buddha as portrayed by the French scholar, then, not the Buddha of the 
Buddhists, who was endowed with the conception of renunciation of the meditation of aspiration, 
thought, effort, and analysis. In contrast, the Buddha as portrayed by the compilers of the 
Divyāvadāna, in terms similar to Burnouf’s own definition, would be endowed with the forces of 
abandonment and with the meditation on the four qualities of aspiration, thought, effort, and 
analysis. Thus, as he envisioned the mental qualities of the Buddha, Burnouf concluded that no 
one in the “ordinary state of humanity” could have been capable of such a prodigious 
abandonment. 
The consequence was that the Buddha may have not developed his mind to such a 
prodigious extent. In Burnouf’s opinion, Buddhist believed the Buddha had been capable of 
detaching himself from all “interior operation.” Therefore, they endowed him with this power 
only in their imagination. In so far as he was a human being, the Buddha could hardly have 
succeeded in the renunciation of all objects of knowledge. Yet the Buddha of the Buddhists, the 
yogin who had mastered magic and vanquished death, was anything but purely human. It was no 
coincidence that one of the epithets of the Buddha is devātideva, the god beyond the gods, for, to 
his disciples, he was endowed with power and knowledge beyond those of humans and gods. 
                                                            
44 See Burnouf (2010, p. 580). 
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Burnouf’s understanding of the Buddha’s magical powers thus derived from his 
particular interpretation and grammatical analysis of the Vocabulaire Pentaglotte’s definition of 
ṛddhipāda. Yet the sense of the French scholar’s disbelief could also be traced to the passage of 
the “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ” where he sought this definition in the first place. It was in his 
commentary on the Buddha’s dialogue with Ānanda, their discussion about the tathāgata’s 
ability to defer death, that Burnouf contested his magical powers. It thus seemed that no ordinary 
human being could defer death, “if so requested, either for a full kalpa, or until the end of the 
kalpa,”45 as the scripture claimed. For it was true, the scripture taught that the Buddha had indeed 
renounced something in order to enter parirvāṇa. Yet this something the Buddha renounced was 
not what Burnouf regarded as the Buddha’s detachment of all mental operations. And so the 
Buddha’s decision did not originate in his meditation on the four ṛddhipādas, or in the 
abandonment explained in their definition. Indeed, as he proclaimed after his dialogue with 
Māra, the Buddha did abandon one thought. It was the very thought of resorting to magic to 
defer death. It is to a different form of abandonment, then, to which we now turn in the avadāna 
of Māndhātṛ to frame Burnouf’s contention about the Buddha’s magical powers. 
 
 
IV 
 
Burnouf’s investigation of the Buddha’s psychic powers had one major consequence to 
his idea of the original content of the Buddha’s simple philosophy. Indeed, as the Buddhist 
compilers of the Divyāvadāna reported in the preamble of the legend of Māndhātṛ, though the 
Buddha claimed to be able to defer death for a cosmic age, or for the remainder of a cosmic age, 
he had not done so. Similarly, the Buddha’s teaching, at the time he announced the parinirvāṇa 
to the monastic assembly, did not center on the denial of death or on its deferral by means of 
magical powers. On the contrary, the Buddha’s teaching on impermanence—“All compounds, O 
monks, are perishable”—centered on the inevitability of death. It centered on the simple 
acceptance of this truth. The Buddha’s claim to see Māra’s hidden, yet inevitable, workings in 
the world, was thus the power of one who had triumphed over the demon of death. It was the 
power of one who not only possessed the first five superknowledges, but who had also attained 
the knowledge of the elimination of the contaminants, that is, the sixth superknowledge. 
The Buddha could thus be in this world, where he preached to various kinds of 
audiences. And this world was also the domain of those who possessed the magical powers of 
the first five superknowledges. Yet the Buddha could be at once beyond the world. This beyond 
was the domain exclusive to the Buddha and to the arhat, who, having attained the sixth 
superknowledge of the extinction of the contaminants, dwelled in nirvāṇa. In this world, where, 
even the unawakened who inhabited the superhuman domain could, along with the Buddha and 
the arhat, develop magical powers, magic itself could be undone by the work of death. For, when 
the Buddha asked him three times, Ānanda missed his suggestion. Hence, the Buddha had passed 
beyond death. Yet because of the workings of Māra in this world, the Buddha’s magical powers 
were still of no avail. For, despite his power to defer death, the Buddha, as the scripture recounts, 
would prolong his life force only if asked by others.  
The story of the Buddha’s decision to enter parinirvāṇa thus revealed the creative 
interpretation its compilers had made of the historical events of their teacher’s death. They did so 
as the historical event of the Buddha’s last days fashioned their world—a world of humans who 
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articulated the vision of a domain of superknowledges. Despite Burnouf’s contestation, the 
content of the Buddha’s teaching on impermanence and death—the Buddha’s simple 
philosophy—were thus intimately related to the articulation of the vision of a world whose 
superhuman domain shaped the narration of the historical event of Śākyamuni’s death. By his 
alternative reading of the term prahāṇa, Burnouf thus extended his argument only so far as to 
assume that the Buddha’s renunciation of the four qualities, and the superhuman powers they 
yielded, had been merely imagined by his direct disciples. 
It is the reality of death, as opposed to the Buddha’s magical powers, that sheds light on 
the proclamation of the imminent parinirvāṇa as a historically self-conscious account of the 
Buddha’s last days. The Buddha’s declaration to be able to defer death by magic inscribes itself 
in a discourse articulated by the vision of superknowledges, whose historicity abided by the rules 
of both the humans who possessed the first five—the certainty of death—and of the Buddha, 
who attained the sixth—the power to defer death—. It was the power of this vision that shaped 
the narration of the Buddha’s announcement of his own death. The doctrinal view of 
impermanence—“All compounds, O monks, are perishable”—, being the simple philosophy that 
Burnouf portrayed as the original core of the Buddha’s teaching, is thus historically situated in 
the human, and in the Buddha’s domain of superknowledges, as both are interwoven in the 
history of the events at the Cāpāla caitya.  
In a parallel sense, in the Divyāvadāna the Buddha’s renunciation to use magic to defer 
death can also be traced to the portion of the legend of Māndhātṛ that Burnouf had left 
untranslated. Here, the Buddha’s decision to enter parinirvāṇa related not only to his dialogue 
with Ānanda and Māra at the Cāpāla caitya, as the story appears in the Pāli Nikāyas, but also to 
another story about magic and death, which better fits with the legends of the Divyāvadāna. It 
was the lesson that Śākyamuni, in his former life as king Māndhātṛ, had once learned about the 
misuse of magical powers. The lesson was about the mistaken use the bodhisattva, in his past life 
as a world conqueror, had already made of magic—a mistake whose consequence was death. 
According to the story, Māndhātṛ was miraculously born as a suvarṇacakravartin, the first type 
of wheel-turning sovereign, a powerful king who is said to be able to occupy and conquer the 
four island continents of the world by the sheer power of his charisma. Māndhātṛ had then 
become renowned for his majestic fall from the summit of Mount Sumeru. It was on his 
deathbed that he, the sovereign of the four continents, had renounced all desire for the world and 
its things, expressing a wish to establish all beings in the religious life.  
Māndhātṛ’s final wish was the prayer that Burnouf provided at the conclusion of the 
preamble of his simple sūtra, before he intentionally interrupted the translation of the avadāna. 
Indeed, the Buddha’s aspiration was what related Śākyamuni’s decision to enter parinirvāṇa, 
narrated in the historical setting of ancient India, with Māndhātṛ’s teaching prior to his death, 
tracing to the mythical beginning of our cosmic age. But the same aspiration was also what 
related Māndhātṛ’s legendary present as a wheel-turning sovereign with his future life as the 
bodhisattva in his very last lifetime: Śākyamuni, the historical Buddha. In this legend of the 
Divyāvadāna, the theme of magic and death, unfolding in the present tense, thus related the 
Buddha’s decision to enter parinirvāṇa with the future of Māndhātṛ’s untimely end, which took 
on meaning as a series of events past.   
I will provide here the salient points of the remaining part of the legend, intentionally left 
untranslated by Burnouf.46 
                                                            
46 For a full English translation of the avadāna see Rotman (2008). See also Schiefner (2007[=1887]) for a 
German translation from Tibetan, and Rouse (1895) for an English translation from Pāli. 
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As soon as the Buddha recited his prayer, he began to recollect his former life. It was a 
time, at the beginning of the present world age, when human beings enjoyed a very long lifespan. 
The continent of Jambudvīpa, the Buddha told Ānanda, was ruled by a king named Upoṣadha, 
who had a son named Māndhātṛ, endowed with the seven precious things and with the catvāra 
ṛddhipādas, the four foundations of magical powers. Māndhātṛ was powerful and charismatic, 
and his skills in the arts of government caused Jambudvīpa to flourish and prosper until, one day, 
he showed signs of discontent. He began to cherish the desire to control the entire world, 
including the three remaining continents of Videha in the east, Godānīya in the west, and 
Uttarakuru in the north. 
Once Māndhātṛ became the sovereign of the world’s four island continents, he then asked 
the yakṣa Divaukasa, a demon who served as his attendant, whether there was still a place in the 
world that was not under his dominion. There was one more place, Divaukasa told the king, that 
he did not control. It was Sudarśana, the magnificent city of the gods of the Trāyastriṃśa, atop 
Mount Sumeru. Thus Māndhātṛ, leading his sons, his army and retinue, rose in the skies, and 
reached the summit of Mount Sumeru. Right before the Trāyastriṃśa, he met the four great kings 
of the four directions Dhṛtarāṣṭra, Virūḍhaka, Virūpākṣa and Vaiśravaṇa. Entranced by 
Māndhātṛ’s charisma, the gods did not even attempt to stop him, but instead joined his retinue, 
became his attendants, and marched ahead of him.  
When Māndhātṛ met the four great kings, they were aware of his power. In awe, they 
informed the gods of the Trāyastriṃśa of his coming. Aware of his power, the thirty-three gods 
welcomed him to the divine city of Sudarśana. Then Śakra, the king of the gods, went to greet 
Māndhātṛ, offering him half of his seat. Māndhātṛ thus ruled with the gods for a very long time. 
Until, one day, the demigods attacked the Trāyastriṃśa heaven. Thanks to his powers, Māndhātṛ 
helped the gods win the war, becoming the most powerful being in the world. At this point, a 
thought arose in the mind of Māndhātṛ. To sanction his dominion over all humans and gods, he 
could have dethroned Śakra, to become the only king of the Trāyastriṃśa, of Sumeru, and of the 
four continents. 
In that very moment, however, Māndhātṛ’s magical powers vanished entirely, for he 
could not kill Śakra. And, because a human could not die in heaven, he fell to Jambudvīpa. In a 
condition of extreme pain, Māndhātṛ knew he would soon die. He thus gathered his ministers to 
express his last wish. Anyone who asked what Māndhātṛ said at the time of death was to be told 
the following: Endowed with the seven precious things and with the four foundations of magical 
powers, the king had established dominion over the entire world, including the four continents 
and the heavenly abodes. Yet the king approached death unsatisfied with the objects of the 
senses. Satisfaction, Māndhātṛ continued, was not to be found even among the divine enjoyments 
of the gods. All pleasure would only lead to suffering. For, at the time of death, they would be of 
no avail. Therefore, how could one who understood the pleasures of the senses as suffering ever 
enjoy even the smallest pleasure of the senses, not to mention the pleasures of the gods? Desire, 
unquenchable for the senses, was the true root of suffering in the world.  
A Buddha’s disciple, Māndhātṛ continued, should have taken pleasure in the extinction of 
desire. Having learned of the imminent death of the king, hundreds of thousands of beings 
gathered in his presence, to hear his discourses on the perils of the pleasures of the senses. And 
so hundreds of thousands of beings developed such a disgust for the pleasures of the senses that 
they abandoned the condition of householder. Hence they set out to the forest to seek guidance 
under the ṛṣis. Having become ṛṣis themselves, they cultivated the four meditative absorptions 
corresponding to the four levels of the form realm. These beings thus completely destroyed 
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desire for the object of the senses, relinquishing the causes of rebirth in the desire realm. As a 
result of their meditation, inspired by Māndhātṛ’s last teaching, hundreds of thousands of beings 
were thus reborn as gods of the form realm, becoming inhabitants of the heavens of the world of 
Brahmā.  
Having completed the recollection of his former life, the Buddha again addressed 
Ānanda. He thus began to identify the beings in the legend with the beings in his presence at 
Vaiśāli. At that time, the Buddha revealed to Ānanda, he himself was none other than Māndhātṛ. 
The Buddha was none other than the king who, in Burnouf’s words, had been “spiteful, 
passionate, given to error, in no way free, slave to the conditions of birth, old age, sickness, 
death, grief, pain, distress, disquiet, misfortune.”47  
In his former life as Māndhātṛ, however, at the moment death, the Buddha had been able 
to inspire hundreds of thousands of beings and established them in the heavens of the world of 
Brahmā. And now three months before his last death in saṃsāra, through his last teaching in the 
city of Vaiśāli prior to parinirvāṇa—“All compounds, O monks, are perishable”—, the Buddha 
had also established hundreds of thousands of beings in the religious life, from their admission 
into the religious order and the taking of precepts, to their attainment of the various levels of the 
disciples and the final fruit of nirvāṇa. When the Buddha completed his discourse, the assembly 
greatly rejoiced, accepting his words. 
 
 
V 
 
The unabridged Sanskrit text of the avadāna of Māndhātṛ remained untranslated for the 
rest of the nineteenth and the entire twentieth century. In 1877, four decades after the Nepalese 
collection of Sanskrit books reached Burnouf’s office in Paris, the Tibetan version of the legend 
of Rgyal po Nga las nu was translated into German by the Estonian Orientalist Franz Anton 
Schiefner (1817-1879), a folklorist and scholar of Tibetan and Mongolian who taught Classics at 
Saint Petersburg. Schiefner’s “Der König Mândhâtar” (“The King Māndhātṛ”) appeared as part 
of Indische Erzählungen (“Indian Tales”), a collection of forty-seven avadānas that was 
published in several installments on Mélange Asiatiques, the Orientalist journal of the Imperial 
Academy of Sciences of Saint Petersburg. The text of the legend was extracted from the ’Dul ba, 
or Vinaya, section of the edition of the Tibetan canon that Vasily Pavlovich Vasil’ev (1818-
1900), at Burnouf’s time the foremost Russian scholar of Buddhism, acquired in Beijing during 
his sojourn in the Russian Orthodox Mission over the 1840s, and which he brought back to Saint 
Petersburg in 1850. 
In his translation from the Tibetan, Schiefner disclosed that Burnouf had translated the 
legend from the Nepalese manuscript of the Divyāvadāna. But in his brief introductory note, the 
Estonian Orientalist did not reveal to his readers the main striking difference between the 
Sanskrit and the Tibetan text. If Burnouf’s translation from Sanskrit only included the preamble 
of the legend, in Schiefner’s translation from Tibetan the preamble was absent. In other words, 
the only complete translation of the avadāna that had been made in a European language during 
the nineteenth century did not include the preamble, where the Buddha discussed the four 
foundations of magical power, taught the doctrine of impermanence—“All compounds, O 
monks, are perishable”—, and announced his own death. In the Tibetan version, the story began 
with Māndhātṛ’s miraculous birth from his father’s head. 
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Hence, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the European public never read 
about the Buddha’s death from the perspective of the legend of Māndhātṛ. The sense of the 
Buddha’s acceptance of death, followed by his teaching on impermanence, and the sense of his 
prayer in relation to Māndhātṛ’s abandonment of the pleasures of the senses, had been impossible 
to reproduce as Burnouf read it in his analysis of the Nepalese Collection from 1841 to 1844. 
What Burnouf popularized as a simple sūtra, in fact, was not the avadāna of Māndhātṛ, but the 
scriptural fragment he himself styled as the “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ”—a fragment that did not exist 
by this title in any Buddhist canonical collection, even less in Hodgson’s Sanskrit Collection of 
Nepal. 
After Burnouf’s assessment of the legend, together with his decision to leave it 
untranslated, his unfinished analysis of the “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ” therefore provided later 
scholarship with the core idea of the simple sūtras. In Burnouf’s analysis of the simple sūtras, the 
idea of a simple moral philosophy he formulated about them thus became the kernel of 
Śākyamuni’s historical life and death. On the other hand, the untranslated avadāna remained the 
fabulous account of Śākyamuni’s former lives and deaths, whose history remained impossible to 
retrieve. 
In 1886, the Sanskrit text of the avadāna of Māndhātṛ appeared in a volume edited by the 
British Orientalist Edward Byles Cowell (1826-1903), the first chair of Sanskrit in Cambridge, 
and by his pupil, the Classical scholar Robert Alexander Neil (1852-1901). The volume was 
entitled: The Divyâvadâna: a collection of early Buddhist legends now first edited from the 
Nepalese Sanskrit MSS in Cambridge and Paris. 
In 1895, the Pāli version of the legend of Mandhātu was translated in the volume entitled 
Jātaka, or Stories of the Buddha’s Former Births, by William Henry Denham Rouse (1863-
1950), a Pāli and Sanskrit student of Cowell and professor of Classics in Cambridge. Like its 
Tibetan counterpart, the Pāli text of the legend of Māndhātṛ included the story of the Buddha’s 
former birth, but lacked the preamble of the Sanskrit text from the Nepalese collection.48 
Unlike the Sanskrit, Tibetan and Pāli versions, the Chinese legend of Dingshengwang, or 
“Crown-born King,” was never translated into a European language. Yet in Chinese, too, the 
avadāna of Māndhātṛ contained the story of the Cakravartin but excluded the preamble.49 
Because of Burnouf’s untimely death, the question of the simple sūtras and their relation 
to the avadāna class of scriptures thus remained suspended. Burnouf did not live to complete his 
original project. But if he had lived, we might imagine that he would have carried on his 
Introduction, completing the remaining memorandums. Perhaps Burnouf’s comparison of the 
Sanskrit collection of Nepal and of the Pāli collection of Sri Lanka would have begun, once 
again, from the the legend of Māndhātṛ, in search of the sense of the Sanskrit term sūtra. Again, 
the results of his comparison might have shown that the preamble only existed in the Sanskrit 
text that Hodgson dispatched from Nepal, and not in the Pāli text of the avadāna, nor in the 
Tibetan and Chinese versions of the legend. In the absence of the author of the Introduction, 
however, all that scholars of Buddhism were left with is the question of his original idea of 
“simple sūtra.” So again, to understand how Burnouf imagined the teaching of the historical 
Buddha as a simple moral philosophy, we begin from his understanding of the term sūtra. 
 
 
 
                                                            
48 See Rouse (1895, pp. 216-218). 
49 See the Foshuo dingshengwang yinyuan jing in Takakusu and Watanabe (1923-24, vol. 3, no. 0165). 
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VI 
 
In Burnouf’s study of the simple sūtras, the second fragment he selected from the 
Divyāvadāna was what he called the “Sūtra of Kanakavarṇa.” Here the Buddha illustrates the 
fruition of almsgiving by recounting the acts of his former life as the king named Kanakavarṇa. 
As noted above, in the Sanskrit collection of Nepal, both legends of Māndhātṛ and Kanakavarṇa 
were entitled avadāna. Like the fragment of the former, which he renamed “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ,” 
Burnouf intentionally changed the title of the avadāna of Kanakavarṇa to “Sūtra of 
Kanakavarṇa.” The reasonings behind the changes, however, were different for each fragment. 
Indeed, for Burnouf the “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ” could be styled as a sūtra because it seemed to 
contain historical elements traceable to the historical epoch of Śākyamuni’s human life. “Despite 
the place that the belief in the supernatural power of the Master occupies,” he clarified, “several 
circumstances of his human life can still be perceived in it.”50  
Although the Buddha was said in the preamble to possess magical powers, a kernel of 
history could still be perceived by the scholar in the “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ.” Thus, because history 
could be perceived in this fragment, Burnouf surmised that, despite the compilers’ belief in the 
miraculous, magic and legend could be said to be absent from the Buddha’s setting. On the other 
hand, because no historical details could be retrieved from the “Sūtra of Kanakavarṇa,” Burnouf 
regarded this text as entirely fabulous. Unlike the “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ,” no historical elements on 
the Buddha’s human life, or the circumstances of his death, could be gleaned from the legend of 
king Kanakavarṇa. Hence, Burnouf changed the title of this avadāna to “Sūtra of Kanakavarṇa” 
for a different reason than the former. “It is worth remarking that this latter piece, which is a real 
sūtra as far as the form is concerned,” he observed, “bears, according to the Sanskrit text and the 
Tibetan translation, the title avadāna, or legend.”51 The question of the authentic historical core 
of a scripture therefore concerned the relation between the scripture’s form and its content. 
The reason behind Burnouf’s renaming was the fact that the legend, despite being only a 
legend, began with the Sanskrit formula evaṃ mayā śrutaṃ, in English “Thus have I heard” 
(literally, “Thus it was heard by me”). This is the phrase that, placed at the beginning of a 
Buddhist scripture, certified that the compiler of such scripture had heard a discourse directly 
from the Buddha, or from a Buddha’s close disciple. The formula served to verify that a given 
discourse was buddhavacana, the “word of the Buddha.” The subject “I” thus commonly 
referred to Ānanda, but in mahāyāna sūtras such as the Lotus Sūtra and in the tantras, when the 
claim was made that a teaching had been preached by the Buddha but had not been heard by 
Ānanda, the teaching could be said to have been reported by another figure, such as the 
bodhisattva Vajrapāṇi. “A sūtra always begins with this formula,” explains Burnouf, “while this 
formula is lacking in all the avadānas I know.”52 Burnouf’s choice of fragments from the 
Divyāvadāna—fragments that could serve as examples of simple sūtras—thus fell on two of a 
handful of avadānas in the collection that simply opened with this formula. 
Burnouf therefore presented the two fragments to the European public as the “Sūtra of 
Māndhātṛ” and the “Sūtra of Kanakavarṇa” because they introduced the setting of the Buddha’s 
discourse with the formula “Thus have I heard.” Still, although the two avadānas opened with the 
formula, according to Burnouf only the former could be said to be a “real sūtra” in both form and 
content. The latter could be regarded as a “real sūtra” only in terms of stylistic form. Unlike the 
                                                            
50 See Burnouf (2010, p. 130). 
51 Ibid. (p. 130). 
52 Ibid. (p. 137). 
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former, the latter was said to have been heard by a human disciple of the Buddha, yet no 
historical elements could be perceived in its content. Hence the legend of Kanakavarṇa could be 
said to contain only fabulous, and not historical, elements about Śākyamuni’s life, elements that 
could serve as the foundation of the Buddha’s simple moral philosophy. “One must then say that 
the legend,” observed Burnouf, “forms the content and material proper of the avadāna, while it is 
nothing more than an accessory of the sūtra, and that it figures there only to confirm, by the 
authority of the example, the teaching of the Buddha, a teaching that is itself independent of the 
account given to support it.”53 For the French scholar, then, the content of the legend had been 
added to the historical core of teaching only to support the Buddha’s simple philosophy 
concerning impermanence and death.  
Lacking in all other avadānas, a preamble such as that of the legend of Māndhātṛ seemed 
to prove that the miraculous accounts of the former lives of the Buddha served only to reinforce 
the significance of the original teaching—“All compounds, O monks, are perishable”—that 
Śākyamuni dispensed in the historical setting of the parinirvāṇa. Hence Burnouf’s comparison 
of the two avadānas proved the following: the content of the preamble—the simple sūtra—was 
independent from that of the legend—the avadāna proper—. The relation between the two 
scriptural categories of sūtra and avadāna thus concerned the relation between history and legend 
as Burnouf understood these terms. Put another way, the relation between sūtra and avadāna 
served to mark the rational and moral essence of what the scholar regarded as the Buddha’s 
simple teaching. 
The simple sūtra, imagined to contain Śākyamuni’s original and independent teaching, 
could thus be said to make sense without the avadāna. The avadāna’s legendary additions, in 
turn, added emphasis but were not essential to the meaning of Śākyamuni’s simple philosophy. 
For Burnouf, then, Śākyamuni’s teaching on impermanence and death as told in the simple sūtras 
would make sense in the Buddhist world of ancient India as it did in the scientific world of 
Oriental philology in modern Europe. In the former, however, Śākyamuni’s human, historical 
life, and his divine, legendary lives across the realms of humans and non-humans, seemed 
inextricable. In the latter, the Buddha had lived a different life as the idol Fo until two decades 
earlier. Now, Śākyamuni inhabited the world of humans, a world tailored around the Buddha’s 
human body, the body of a philosopher of European descent.  
Burnouf’s belief in the absence of magical powers in the setting of the Buddha’s 
preaching articulated his scientific imagination of Śākyamuni’s humanity in a setting conceived 
through this absence. Thus, as Burnouf displaced the magical foundation that is inherent to 
Buddhist scriptures, despite the miraculous elements that marked them, the sūtras could be said 
to convey historical details of the human world as imagined by the science of philology, whereas 
the avadānas could be said to contain entirely fabulous narrations where this world was 
ungraspable—the stories concerning the former and future lives of the Buddha, and of his 
disciples, throughout the three realms of saṃsāra. The Buddha’s life and death as a human being 
could thus take a different sense in each of these two worlds. 
In Burnouf’s mind, it was thus the separation between the teaching of the sūtras—
imagined as discourses unfolding in history—and of the avadānas—regarded as supporting 
accounts reflecting magical and legendary elements—that amounted to the separation of these 
two worlds. To Burnouf, a sūtra was a discourse of the Buddha that conveyed Śākyamuni’s 
simple and authentic teaching that been taught in the historical setting of an ancient Indian city. 
His removal of the magical content of Buddhist discourse is thus to be regarded as the dominant 
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element in the formation of Burnouf’s idea of simple sūtra. His idea of the Buddha’s authentic 
teaching thus originated from his comparison of the Sanskrit manuscripts of the avadānas of 
Māndhātṛ and Kanakavarṇa, two of a handful stories of the collection marked with the evaṃ 
mayā śrutaṃ opening formula. 
 
 
VII 
 
Once again, to identify the “I” who heard the Buddha’s discourses in the opening 
formula, Burnouf dwelled on a scripture that conveyed the solemn moment of the Buddha’s 
death. This time, however, the scripture Burnouf analyzed was not an avadāna, but a mahāyāna 
sūtra. “If we are to believe the tradition preserved in a passage of the Mahākaruṇāpuṇḍarikā 
Sūtra, a book translated into Tibetan,” observes Burnouf, “it is Śākyamuni himself who 
determined the form of the sūtras, when he recommended to his disciples that they respond to the 
religious who come to question them.”54 In his reading of a passage from the 
Mahākaruṇāpuṇḍarikā Sūtra, then, Burnouf explains how he came to believe that Śākyamuni 
himself had suggested to his disciples, the evening of his entry into parinirvāṇa, the stylistic 
form in which his discourses had to be preserved and transmitted. Thus for the French scholar 
the source of the formal style of the sūtras traced back to none other than Śākyamuni. “I have no 
doubt,” he explained, certain of his knowledge of Buddhist scriptures, “about the authenticity of 
this passage, which we will find in almost the same form in the Pāli books.”55 Yet Burnouf did 
not read the passage in question in a Pāli scripture; nor did he read this passage in the Sanskrit 
manuscript of the Mahākaruṇāpuṇḍarikā Sūtra. For, not only was this mahāyāna sūtra missing 
from Hodgson’s collection of Sanskrit books, but there was another fact that Burnouf, at the 
time, ignored. The Mahākaruṇāpuṇḍarikā Sūtra was extant in Tibetan and Chinese translation, 
but not in Sanskrit. His knowledge of English would suffice. 
The passage to which Burnouf referred had appeared in 1836, as Burnouf began to 
translate the Lotus Sūtra, in Asiatic Researches. It was part of the summary of the 
Mahākaruṇāpuṇḍarikā Sūtra that Csoma provided in his 1836 “Analysis of the Sher-chin—
P’hal-chen—Dkon-séks—Do-de—Nyáng-das—and Gyut; being the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th 
divisions of the Tibetan Work, entitled the Kah-gyur.” Here, set in a grove of śāla trees near the 
city of Kuśa, or Kuśinagarī, on the evening of the Buddha’s passing into final nirvāṇa, the sūtra 
opens with Śākyamuni’s teaching to Ānanda. As he lies on his deathbed between two śāla trees, 
a series of miracles occurs. The Buddha then welcomes Brahmā, who has descended from his 
heavenly abodes in the formless realm to pay him homage, and with whom the Buddha discusses 
the subject of the creation of the world. Śākyamuni, then, before instructing his direct disciples 
on how to collect his teaching, receives the god Indra and the four great kings.56 Thus the 
                                                            
54 Ibid. (p. 116). 
55 Ibid. (p. 116). 
56 I provide here the Transylvanian scholar’s abridged description of the Mahākaruṇāpuṇḍarikā, as 
Burnouf read it, from the sixth division of his discussion of the mdo, or sūtra, division of the Tibetan canon. Csoma 
writes: “The second treatise (from leaves 76 to 187) is entitled in Sanscrit, A´rya máha karuńa puń’daríka náma 
mahá yána sútra. In Tibetan, Hp’hags-pa-snying-rjé-ch-hén-po-pad-ma-dkar-po-zhés-bya-va-t’hég-pa-ch’èn-pohi-
mdo. Eng. A venerable sútra of high principles, called “Puń’daríka, the great merciful one.” This was delivered by 
SHA´KYA in a grove of Sál trees near the town of Ku´sha (Káma-rúpa, in Assan) on the evening he was about to 
die. Addressing KUN-DGAH-VO (Sans. A´nanda) he orders him to prepare him his dying bed. He tells him his 
performances, and the substance of his doctrine. His discourse with A´NANDA. The miracles that happened when 
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Bhagavat, having entrusted the world where “all is illusion” to Brahmā’s care, addressed his 
foremost disciples Ānanda and Kāśyapa, instructing them about the future. The Buddha thus told 
his disciples what to do with what would remain of him after death: his vacana—his words—, 
and his śarīra—his body—. 57 
Hence, in Csoma’s presentation of the Mahākaruṇāpuṇḍarikā Sūtra, Śākyamuni himself 
was said to have instructed Ānanda on the twelvefold division of scripture, the same division 
Hodgson reported in his essays according to the Buddhists of Nepal. This mahāyāna sūtra thus 
ascribed the classification of Śākyamuni’s doctrine in twelve divisions, including the (1) sūtra, 
(2) geya, (3) vyākaraṇa, (4) gāthā, (5) udāna, (6) nidāna, (7) ityukta, (8) jātaka, (9), vaipulya, 
(10) adbhuta dharma, (11) avadāna, and (12) upadeśa divisions, to the Buddha himself. 
Therefore, as Csoma had reported according to the Mahākaruṇāpuṇḍarikā Sūtra, and as Burnouf 
came to believe after reading it, Śākyamuni would have personally requested Ānanda to report 
his doctrine to the assembly of dge slong (Tibetan for bhikṣu, or monks) with the opening 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
he lay down (between a pair of Sál trees) on his right side, like a lion—all trees, shrubs, and grasses bow themselves 
towards that side; all rivers or streams stand still; all beasts and birds sit still and move not for food; all lucid or 
shining bodies are affuscated; all sufferers in hell are assuaged; all those in misery are relieved; all the gods feel 
some displeasure with their own residence. TS’HA´NGS-PA (Sans. Brahmá,) together with his train, pays his 
respect to BCHOM-LDAN-HDAS. From leaves 80 to 90, there is a description of their conversation on the subject 
of creation—by whom the world was made. SHA´KYA asks several questions to BRAHMA´—whether was it he 
who made or produced such and such things, and endowed or blessed them with such and such virtues or 
properties—whether it was he who caused the several revolutions in the destruction and regeneration of the world. 
He denies that he had ever done any thing to that effect. At last he himself asks SHA´KYA how the world was 
made—by whom? Here are attributed all changes in the world to the moral works of the animal beings, and it is 
stated that the world all is illusion; there is no reality in the things; all is empty. BRAHMA´ being instructed in his 
doctrine, becomes his follower. SHA´KYA vindicating the universe for himself, commits it to the care of 
BRAHMA´, and directs him what to do for promoting virtue and happiness in the world, leaf 90. His (SHA´KYA’S) 
conversation with DED-DPON, the son of KA´MA-DE´VA—his instructions to him. His conference with INDRA, 
(Tib. Brgya-byin) and with the four great kings of the giants (Tibetan Lhamayin). He gives several lessons to these 
four kings, and advises them to live contented, and not to make war against INDRA. They promise that they will 
obey his commands. Leaf 100, the lamentation of INDRA on the approaching death of SHA´KYA.” See Csoma de 
Kőrös (1836, pp. 433-4). 
57 The passage that marked Burnouf’s understanding of the term sūtra as a philosophical discourse 
unfolding in history appeared on “leaf 181” of the Tibetan scripture. Csoma continues: “Leaf 109. KUN-DGAH-VO 
is comforted by SHA´KYA, and directed what to do after his death (leaves 110-112). HOD-SRUNG (Sans. 
Káshyapa) the immediate successor of SHA´KYA. His qualities. SHA´KYA tells to A´NANDA the increase of the 
believers in his doctrine, and the great veneration that will be shewn to the places of his relics. Leaf 124, the great 
qualifications of KUN-DGAH-VO, or A´NANDA. SHA´KYA’s instructions to him. Leaf 181. On the request of 
KUN-DGAH-VO, SHA´KYA directs him what to do with respect to the compilation of his doctrine. Here are 
enumerated the twelve different kinds of the Buddhistic writings. He is directed to answer to the priests or Gelongs, 
when they shall ask where it was delivered,—“Hdi-skad-bdag-gis-t’hos-pa-dus-gchig-na”—I myself heard this at a 
certain time, when BCHOM-LDAN-HDAS was at such and such places, and the hearers were these and these; and 
that when he had finished his lecture, all those that were present rejoiced much, and approved his doctrine. The 
principal places where SHA´KYA had delivered the sútras of his doctrine, are here enumerated. They are the 
Byang-ch’ub-snying-po, (Sans. Bodhimań’da, or Gayá in Magadha) under a Nyagrodha tree. Váranási, in the grove 
called Drang-srong lhung-va-ri-dags-kyi-nags. Rájagriha, and hear to it the Bya-rgod-p’hung-pohi-ri, and the Hod-
mahi-ts’hal. Mnyan-yod (S. Shrávasti). Yangs-pa-chen (Sans. Vaishali or Priyága, Allahabad) Champa (on the bank 
of a tank dug by GARGA). Kaushambi, Sakétana, (Tib. Gnas-bchas,) Pataliputra, or Patna. (Tib. Skya-nar-gyi-bu.) 
Mathura, (Tib. Bchom-rlag,) Kámarupa, &c. He is directed farther to make introduction to them, to explain the 
subject with an amplification of the causes and effects, in good sense and proper terms of words, and to arrange the 
whole in such and such a manner. There are in this sútra six bam-pos and thirteen chapters. This was translated by 
the Indian Pandits JINA-MITRA and SURENDRA-BODHI, and the Tibetan Lotsava BANDE´ YE´SHE´S-SDE´.” 
Ibid. (pp. 435-6). 
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formula ’di skad bdag gis thos pa dus gcig na—in Sanskrit, evaṃ mayā śrutaṃ ekasmin samaye, 
“Thus did I hear at one time.” Ānanda was then the rapporteur, the “I,” the human disciple who 
heard the transmission of the Buddha’s teaching, at a certain time of the Buddha’s career, and in 
a certain setting.58  
The Mahākaruṇāpuṇḍarikā Sūtra, reported by its compilers to have been taught in the 
city of Kuśinagara, then lists the places where Ānanda heard the Buddha’s teaching, including 
the cities of Gayā, where Śākyamuni was said to have attained awakening, Sarnath, near 
Vārāṇasī, where he delivered his first sermon, Rājagṛha, the royal capital of the Buddha’s patron 
King Bimbisāra, and Vaiśāli, where he taught the “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ.” After the enunciation of 
the setting, the Buddha would have finally instructed Ānanda on the formal style of the sūtra. 
Therefore when reporting a Buddha’s discourse, Ānanda had to use specifically sets phrases and 
give the entire scripture a specific formal presentation. The formal presentation of the teaching, 
certifying that it had been spoken by the Buddha, would have then been translated from Sanskrit 
into the other Buddhist languages, such as in the case of the late eight to early ninth century 
Tibetan translator Ye shes sde, aided in the translation by the Indian scholars Jinamitra and 
Śīlendrabodhi. 
The Mahākaruṇāpuṇḍarikā Sūtra thus recounted, from the perspective of a mahāyāna 
sūtra, the mode through which a teaching could be certified as buddhavacana—the word of the 
Buddha. The lesson Burnouf learned from the above passage in Csoma’s summary was clear. 
The stylistic form of a scripture, that is, whether a scripture had an opening formula, whether it 
had been heard by a human disciple of the Buddha, and whether it was set in an Indian city, 
should have reflected its original, historical content. The passage from the 
Mahākaruṇāpuṇḍarikā Sūtra demonstrated two main points to Burnouf. First, he came to the 
conclusion that the formal style of the sūtras traced directly to the Buddha’s word. Second, he 
came to believe that the opening formula “Thus did I hear at one time” had originated from the 
Buddha’s necessity to make a distinction between the teachings he had truly spoken from those 
which, after his death, may have been claimed as his authentic teaching. In other words, the 
opening formula, in Burnouf’s perspective, was the stylistic device that Śākyamuni would have 
consigned to his disciples at the moment of death as a seal of the historical authenticity of his 
teaching. 
Yet, as it appears in the Divyāvadāna, the preamble of the legend of Māndhātṛ, telling of 
the events of the Buddha’s last days, is absent from the Pāli, Tibetan and Chinese renderings of 
the same legend. It should also be noted, however, that a version of the same preamble appears in 
another scripture, in fact, the most renowned scripture on the events of the Buddha’s last days. 
The story of the Buddha’s dialogue with Ānanda and with Māra in fact appears in the third 
section of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, or “Great Discourse on the Final Nirvāṇa,” known to have 
existed in Sanskrit, and extant in Pāli as the Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta. 
As Burnouf notes, the Sanskrit text of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra had not been 
dispatched by Hodgson with the Nepalese Collection. But, as he read the Divyāvadāna, it 
occurred to Burnouf that the story as told in the fragment of the Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta was the 
same as the one told in the preamble of the avadāna of Māndhātṛ. “Later, I will compare the 
present sūtra,” Burnouf wrote, referencing his simple sūtra, “with the Parinibbāṇa Sutta of the 
Sinhalese, of which Mr. Turnour has already given some fragments of the highest interest and 
                                                            
58 See the study by Lopez (1996, pp. 19-46). For the standards of scriptural authority in the Buddhism of 
India, see Davidson (1990). 
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translated with a rare exactitude.”59 Burnouf had in fact learned in some detail the account of the 
Buddha’s death soon after he received Hodgson’s manuscripts in 1837. 
 
 
VIII 
 
A partial translation of the Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta had been rendered from Pāli into 
English by George Turnour (1799-1843), a British civil servant who resided in Ceylon, and had 
been published in 1838 on the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal. Yet this discovery 
did not seem to play a major role in Burnouf’s formulation of the idea of simple sūtra. In effect, 
having deferred the comparison between the Sanskrit and the Pāli versions of the story to a later 
time, Burnouf dwelled on the Sanskrit source, on its own terms, of the story of the Buddha’s 
decision to enter parinirvāṇa, so that he could ascertain its place within the Divyāvadāna and the 
Sanskrit Collection. But as the comparison was suspended by Burnouf’s untimely death, the 
relation between history and legend as told in Burnouf’s reading of the Divyāvadāna would 
affect future comparisons of the sūtras, as he defined the term, with other classes of Buddhist 
scriptures, and, in particular, with the tantra class of scriptures. 
And so, the twofold content of the avadāna of Māndhātṛ, namely, what Burnouf regarded 
as its historical and as its legendary content, could be related in more than one sense. In 
Burnouf’s comparison of the “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ” and the “Sūtra of Kanakavarṇa,” he discussed 
his idea of the relation between history and legend in Buddhist scriptures by taking the story of 
the preamble (1) as an integral part of the legend of Māndhātṛ, but also, at the same time, (2) as a 
scriptural fragment that was independent from the avadāna. In other words, although he knew 
that the story of the preamble had been told separately in different contexts, for it also appeared 
in the Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta, Burnouf chose to discuss its sense as a historical teaching of the 
Buddha as it appeared in the Sanskrit text of the avadāna of Māndhātṛ. Burnouf’s analysis of the 
twofold content of the avadāna thus centered on the mode through which the preamble related to 
the entire avadāna in terms of difference between history and legend. The legendary content, as 
Burnouf put it, therefore simply served to support the sense of the teaching of the Buddha that 
unfolded in the historical circumstances of his human life in ancient India. 
Perhaps, in his future comparison, Burnouf would have also discussed the story of the 
Buddha’s decision to enter parinirvāṇa in relation to the different sections of the 
Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta. He would have thus compared the position of the “Thus have I heard” 
formula in the Pāli sutta, that is, whether the formula actually opened the story in the Pāli text of 
the story as it did in the Sanskrit text of the Divyāvadāna. In fact, the compilers of the 
Divyāvadāna had affixed the formula to the incipit of the avadāna of Māndhātṛ, whereas the 
compilers of the Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta—and this was clear to Burnouf from Turnour’s 
translation—had not done so, for the story appeared in the third section of the Pāli scripture. 
Perhaps, in Burnouf’s analysis, the story of the Buddha’s dialogue with Ānanda about the 
ṛddhipādas, and with Māra concerning his entry into parinirvāṇa, could thus be regarded as 
independent in another sense. For, the French savant would have observed that the story may 
have been not only independent from the title of sūtra—for it appeared in both a Sanskrit 
avadāna and in a Pāli sutta—, but also from the opening formula—for it was the first section of a 
Sanskrit avadāna, yet only the third in a Pāli sutta. 
                                                            
59 See Burnouf (2010, p. 118n). 
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The Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta is the sixteenth and longest scripture of the Dīghanikāya, the 
“Collection of Long Discourses” forming the Suttapiṭaka. “It consists of six Bhánawárá,” wrote 
Turnour in 1838, commenting on the scripture’s structure and number of sections (P. 
bhāṇavāra), “and commences with the words ‘the following was heard by myself,’ being the 
introductory expression used by A´NANDO.”60 It was clear from Turnour’s translation, then, that 
the opening formula had been affixed to the first section of the sutta, which tells of the Buddha’s 
journey in fourteen stations, from the city of Rājagṛha, towards the place of his death, the city of 
Kuśinagarī. En route, ever accompanied by Ānanda, the Buddha dispenses a variety of teachings 
to different audiences. And the Buddha’s teaching on impermanence and death, pronounced 
shortly after his announcement of the imminent parinirvāṇa, appears in the third section of the 
sutta, during his station in Vaiśāli. 
As told in the previous section of the sutta, that is, in the second section, before they walk 
to the Cāpāla caitya, the Buddha and Ānanda visit the mango grove of Āmrapālī, a local 
courtesan who just met the Buddha in the nearby city of Kotigāma. Entranced by the Buddha’s 
teaching on the four noble truths (S. catvāry āryasatyāni), Āmrapālī hosts the Buddha to a meal 
and donates her mango grove to the monastic community. It is after his meal with Āmrapālī that 
the Buddha, now eighty years old, manifests the first symptoms of the severe illness that would 
lead to his death. The symptoms of the Buddha’s disease would then be described in the fourth 
section, after his departure from Vaiśāli. Here, stationed at the city of Pāvā, the Buddha 
consumes his last meal, prepared with “tender boar” (S. sūkaramārdava) by the blacksmith 
named Cunda, resulting in the fatal dysentery from which Śākyamuni suffers until the evening of 
his parinirvāṇa in Kuśinagarī. 
The third section of the sutta, placed between the stories of the Buddha’s last meals with 
Āmrapālī and with Cunda, tells of the same events of Burnouf’s “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ.”61 Despite 
its absence in Turnour’s “Third Bhánawáro,” Burnouf was bound by the spell of the “Thus have 
I heard” formula opening Buddhist scriptures. Described in detail in the Mahākaruṇāpuṇḍarikā 
Sūtra, the opening formula is a literary device that marks all scriptures, in particular the 
mahāyāna sūtras and the tantras, claiming to be the word of the Buddha. In such manner, 
adhering to the logic of this literary device, Burnouf came to believe that if the opening formula 
was present, the content of a scripture must have revealed historical details of Śākyamuni’s 
human life. Historical details aside, if the scripture also encompassed legendary content, such 
                                                            
60 See Turnour (1838, p. 991). 
61 I report hereafter the first three paragraphs in Turnour’s translation of the “Third Bhánawáro,” as read by 
Burnouf: “Subsequently, on a certain morning, BHAGAWÁ makes a pilgrimage in search of alms through Wésáli, 
and after his morning repast attended by A´NANDO, repairs for his noon-day rest to the Chepúlá chétiyo. 
BUDDHO there expatiates on the perfections of that chétiyo, as well as the Wésáli, the Udéni, the Gótamá, the 
Sattambako, the Bahupatto and the Sárandado chétiyáni; and explains that it is in the power of any BUDDHO, by 
his four (idhi) miraculous attributes, to prolong his existence even for a kappó, if, while sojourning at any of these 
places he is duly entreated thereto. MÁRO (Death) imperceptibly exerts his influence, and prevents A´NANDO 
from comprehending this exposition made by the BHAGAWÁ, thought repeated twice. A´NANDO then retires at 
the foot of a tree, disconcerted, and seats himself there. Before A´NANDO had proceeded to any great distance, the 
impious MÁRO approaches the BHAGAVA´, and having approached him and stationed himself on one side of him, 
thus addressed him: Lord BHAGAVA´, vouchsafe to realize thy Parinibbánán now. SUGATO, this is the appointed 
time for thy Parinibbánán. It had been declared so by thee, Lord BHAGAVA´, on a former occasion, &c. 
BHAGAVA´ replies that his death is at hand; and that his Parinibbánán will take place in three months. He then 
announces his resignation of all connection with this transitory state of existence, to prepare for his death, by 
chanting this hymn. “Having voluntarily overcome his desire for this life, the Muni has vouchsafed to relinquish all 
that is transitory, connected either with his human or divine essence, casting his existence from him, like unto a 
victorious combatant who divests himself of his armor.” See Turnour (1838, pp. 1000-1). 
 30 
addition meant that legend had been added to historical account as a support of the Buddha’s 
simple, moral teaching. But if the formula was present and yet the scholar could not perceive any 
seemingly historical content in the scripture, the consequence would be the following: Buddhist 
compilers must have (1) styled the scripture as a sūtra, or (2) added the opening formula, only in 
an attempt to promote legend as history—namely, to elevate a teaching that Śākyamuni had not 
spoken to the rank of buddhavacana. 
As shown in the Prātihārya Sūtra, the famous “Discourse on the Miracle,” the compilers 
of Buddhist scriptures could add the term sūtra to the title of a scripture that not only lacked the 
“Thus have I heard” formula, but that reported, entirely in the present tense and in the setting of 
the Indian city of Śrāvastī, the fabulous account of the Buddha’s display of magical powers. 
Burnouf’s choice of terms in what he called the simple sūtras—the “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ” and the 
“Sūtra of Kanakavarṇa”—enacted a similar thought. Like Buddhist compilers, the founder of the 
European study of Buddhism availed himself of the Buddhist device through which, by adding 
the term sūtra to the title of a scriptural fragment of his personal choice, he could seal a text, and 
promote it, among the European public, as a discourse of the Buddha that unfolded in history. In 
so doing, the moral philosophy of the simple sūtra, as Burnouf popularized it, removed the 
Buddha and his doctrine from the historically self-conscious world, articulated by the vision of 
the superknowledges, where the compilers of the events leading to the parinirvāṇa recounted 
their master’s loss. 
To end, let us dwell on a term that Turnour left untranslated in his version of the 
Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta: “kappó,” that is, kappa in Pāli, often rendered into English as “aeon,” or 
“cosmic age.” This is a term whose Sanskrit equivalent kalpa, like Turnour, Burnouf also 
decided to leave untranslated in his simple sūtra, for he had previously done so in the French 
rendering of the Lotus Sūtra.62 In reading Turnour’s translation, Burnouf was certainly unaware 
of the fact that Buddhist commentators had engaged in a dispute concerning the Buddha’s 
statement, at the Cāpāla caitya, of being able to defer death, after the division into the proponents 
of the Sthāviranikāya and the Mahāsāṃghika during the second council at Vaiśālī, about a 
century after the Buddha’s death. Indeed, the dispute not only centered on the question of 
whether the Buddha could defer death, but also on the question of how, and how long, he could 
do so. Indeed, despite the Buddha’s claim to possess the ability to generate new life force (S. 
āyuḥ saṃskāra), early Buddhist commentators did not agree on the manner in which he could do 
so by mastery of ṛddhi. If, taking the teaching of karma into account, any life force was 
determined at the moment of birth by the power of former deeds (S. karma-vipāka), it was not 
clear how new life force could be generated by magical powers deriving from meditative 
absorption, when the limit of life force deriving from former deeds was reached.63 
Hence, in the passage of the Buddha’s dialogue with Ānanda, where he declares that one 
who has mastered the four ṛddhipādas can extend one’s life for “either for a full kalpa, or until 
the end of the kalpa,”64 the contention dwelled on the Sthaviranikāya interpretation of kalpa as 
“lifespan” (S. āyuḥ kalpa), which amounts to about one hundred years, and the Mahāsāṃghika 
reading of kalpa as “great aeon” (S. mahākalpa), which is more than a trillion years. Hence, 
when confronted with the Buddha’s claim to be able to perform the miracle of eternal life, many 
                                                            
62 See Burnouf (2010, p. 126). Burnouf writes a long note about the term kalpa in his translation of the 
Lotus Sūtra, but he does not make a distinction concerning different uses of the term in the Divyāvadāna, in the 
Lotus Sūtra and in the Sukhāvatīvyūha. See Burnouf (1852, pp. 324-329). 
63 On the issue concerning the Buddha’s prolongation of life, see the studies by Jaini (1958) and Gethin 
(2001, pp. 94-97). 
64 See Burnouf (2010, p. 119). 
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early exegetes could not accept it on the basis of the explanation of the ability to generate new 
life force by magical powers. In disbelief, despite the difficulty of reconciling the Buddha’s 
miraculous powers with karma, they still granted the Buddha these powers, but interpreted the 
term kalpa to mean “lifespan.” In contrast, it was not difficult to interpret the term kalpa as 
“great aeon” for Buddhist exegetes who not only granted the Buddha the ability to prolong life, 
but who also sustained the Buddha’s claim to be able to live for a great cosmic age.”65 
Regardless, all accorded to the Buddha the mastery of ṛddhi and the power to control his life 
forces to some extent, whether to prolong his lifespan to reach the age limit for a human being, 
or to reach the end of the present great aeon, that is, the end of the world.66 
“Could the Buddha defer death?” Thus, can Burnouf’s quest be formulated after his 
reading of the “Sūtra of Māndhātṛ”? Clearly, like many scholars of Buddhism after him, his 
answer would be, “No.” But no doubt, Burnouf’s question is already implied in the history of the 
early commentarial traditions. For, if the dispute on the nature of the Buddha’s decision to 
relinquish life was not always expressed in terms of the question, “Could the Buddha defer 
death?” it was in terms of the question, “How, and how long, could the Buddha defer death?” 
The doubt that the Buddha was unable to prolong his lifespan by magic is inherent to the 
historical consciousness of the early commentarial traditions. Regardless of whether the Buddha 
could extend his life force for an āyuḥ kalpa or a mahākalpa, all commentarial traditions 
accorded him to some degree the power to do so. For, the mastery of ṛddhi was in every case 
regarded in the Buddhism of India as a product of samādhi. Hence, the Buddhists’s question of 
how, and how long, the Buddha could defer death, become a single question with Burnouf’s 
question, regarding whether the Buddha could defer death at all. On the twofold horizon of this 
single question, the Buddha’s decision to enter parinirvāṇa retains the historicity, the humanity, 
and the truth of his teaching on impermanence—“All compounds, O monks, are perishable”—
and on the inevitability of death. It does so as the reaction to the master’s loss unfolds in the 
history of a world articulated by the vision of superknowledges, a world where the tathāgata, the 
god beyond the gods, is always full master of death and its demons. 
                                                            
65 In the chapter on “Indriyas” of his Abidharmakośabhāṣya, Vasubandhu presents the various views on the 
prolongation and the shortening of lifespan according to the abhidharma traditions. In the final section of his 
excursus, he writes: “Why does the Blessed One cast off [death] and extend [life]? With the aim of showing that he 
possesses mastery over death, he casts off death; with the aim of showing that he possesses mastery over life, he 
extends it. He extends it for a period of three months, no more, no less; after three months, there is nothing more to 
do for his followers, after his task is well achieved, for, short of three months, he would leave his task unachieved. 
Or rather, with the aim of realizing this vow: ‘Any Bhikṣu who has well cultivated the four supernormal powers 
(ṛddhipāda, vi.69b), can live, if he so desires, a kalpa or more.’ The Vaibhāṣikas say: ‘With the aim of showing that 
he triumphs over the Mara who is the skandhas, and over the Mara who is death. In the first watch of the night, 
under the Bodhi Tree, he has already triumphed over the Mara who is a demon, and, in the third watch, over the 
Mara who is the defilements (Ekottarika, TD 2, p. 760b17 and following).’” See de la Vallé Poussin (1990, Vol. 1, 
pp. 165-68). 
66 Gethin (2001, p. 97) concludes his study with the following statement: “What does all this signify for the 
understanding of the iddhi-pādas? Ignoring the question of āyu-kappa and mahā-kappa, the answer is, I think, quite 
straightforward. One who develops fully the iddhi-pādas is clearly understood to have at least some power to extend 
his life; he has at least some control over the particular factors that determine the time of death. This, in fact, accords 
quite well withe the treatment of the iddhi-pādas elsewhere in the texts. As I have tried to illustrate, the iddhi-pādas 
are primarily concerned with the development of skill and facility in samādhi or types of meditative attainment, and 
they are frequently explicitly associated with various meditative powers that are linked to the development of jhāna. 
That an aspect or by-product of this kind of mastery of the forces of the mind is seen as an ability to have some 
measure of control over the factors that determine the moment of death, is not a notion peculiar to the Nikāyas, but 
entirely consistent with the wider Indian yogic tradition.” 
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Still, such demons—the human māras—of grief and nostalgia, inscribed themselves as 
the denial of the master’s death into the history of the tradition, for thus says the Buddha, 
 
“I proclaim monks, sons of good lineage, that I will enter into final nirvāṇa, although I refrain 
from doing so. Why? In this manner I lead all beings to maturity. If I remain too long in the world, 
those beings who have not acquired roots of virtue, who are impure, who are miserable, who are 
driven by their blind desires, and surrounded by nets of false doctrines, they, in seeing the 
tathāgata unceasingly, would say: ‘The tathāgata remains in the world;’ and they would imagine 
that there is nothing as easy to meet; they would not conceive the thought that there is anything 
difficult to obtain. If they said: ‘We are close to the tathāgata,’ they would not employ their 
energy to escape the gathering of the three worlds, and they would not conceive the thought that 
the tathāgata is difficult to meet,”67 
 
as Burnouf translates the fifteenth chapter of the Lotus Sūtra, entitled “La durée de la vie 
du tathāgata” (“The Lifespan of the Tathāgata”), in whose compelling parables, during the late 
1830s, his quest for the Buddha’s simple moral philosophy began. There is then an irony in this 
quest, opening the relation of Buddhism and philosophy to another sense, as the beliefs and 
knowledge of the historian-philologist are found to be constitutive of such a relation. For, unlike 
the doctrine of the mortal Buddha of the Divyāvadāna, who triumphs over Māra not in the denial 
but in the embrace of death, the moral message of the Lotus Sūtra is the doctrine of the deathless 
Buddha, who never truly passes into parinirvāṇa. It is the doctrine of the Buddha who, by secret 
and transcendent powers, puts on display the spectacle of death only as a means to free all beings 
from the three realms of saṃsāra. It is clear by now where a philosophical reading of Buddhism, 
whose major nineteenth-century proponents were Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, intersects with 
the steps that the Buddha has taken across Europe after the Age of Enlightenment, from 
Deshauterayes’s idol Fo to Oldenberg’s Buddha, from the Buddha of the Lotus Sūtra to the 
Buddha of the Divyāvadāna, from the cult of voidness to Buddhist philosophy. How the 
philosophical dimension of Burnouf’s reading contributed to fashioning philosophy as such 
during the late nineteenth and into the twentieth century—to begin with Schopenhauer’s idea of 
the “denial of the will-to-live” in The World as Will and Representation—is a question that 
awaits further consideration.68 
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